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Abstract 
This thesis examines whether the gender of engagement audit partners affects 
client acceptance decisions. Using a sample of 2,767 firm-year observations of firms 
listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) from 2013 to 2014, this study 
empirically investigates and compares the riskiness of clienteles between female and 
male auditors. The results indicate that on average female auditors have less risky 
clients in their client portfolios than male auditors. Furthermore, the negative 
association between female auditor gender and the level of risk in clienteles is more 
pronounced among the riskiest group of clients. The findings of this thesis suggest that 
gender differences between auditors may have important implications for client 
acceptance decisions and that such differences are more likely driven by high-risk 
engagement decisions. 
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1.1 BACKGROUND 
Over the past decade, the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, economic volatility 
and heightened client business risk, when combined with the inherent complexities of 
financial reporting requirements, impose enormous challenges on auditors (Institute of 
Chartered Accountants Australia [ICAA], 2013; International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board [IAASB], 2014). Accordingly, the importance of implementing and 
following rigorous client acceptance procedures in audit firms as a quality control 
system has been highlighted by both external regulators and within the accounting 
profession (CPA Australia, 2010; ICAA, 2013; ASIC, 2015). The client acceptance 
decision is vitally important to audit firms and auditors, particularly in today’s high-risk 
environment. A high-risk client could seriously jeopardise an audit firm’s viability, as 
was most famously demonstrated by the collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2002.  
The client acceptance decision function is an integral part of the overall audit 
process, involving evaluation of the total engagement risk associated with a particular 
client and demanding considerable professional judgement from audit engagement 
partners (Colbert et al. 1996). Professional standards also require partners to take 
responsibility for evaluating the overall engagement risk level before accepting and 
implementing appropriate procedures in audit engagement (ASA 220, para 8), while 
acknowledging that “there is not necessarily one correct answer in making a judgement” 
(International Federation of Accountants [IFAC], 2012, p. 3). Similarly, the Deloitte 
audit firm notes in its 2015 transparency report that “…every audit engagement is led 
by a partner, and our engagement partners are fully responsible for the services they 
provide” (p. 14). Therefore, while audit firms implement a set of formal procedures 
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regarding client acceptance decisions, the actual amount of client-related evidence 
collected and detailed evaluation of risk factors are determined by the audit partner in 
charge of the engagement. Despite the significant role of individual auditors, except for 
a few experimental studies (Johnstone 2000; Johnstone and Bedard 2003; Cohen and 
Hanno 2000), prior empirical research has focused largely on audit firms’ client 
portfolio management viewed primarily through the lens of trade-offs between expected 
revenues from engagement and possible engagement losses such as litigation costs and 
reputation loss (Choi et al. 2004; Jones and Raghunandan 1998; Krishnan and Francis 
2002). This thesis aims to fill this gap by examining the impact of the individual 
characteristics of auditors in the context of the client acceptance decision.   
The importance of individual auditors’ characteristics as a supply-side input to 
audit quality has recently been highlighted by both regulators and audit researchers (e.g., 
Gul et al. 2013; DeFond and Zhang 2014). For example, in the framework of audit 
quality published by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), the “personal qualities of 
engagement partners” are specified as one of the five drivers of audit quality (FRC 2008, 
p. 3). Furthermore, a growing body of audit literature recognising that auditors should 
not be assumed to be homogenous within audit firms has called for more attention to be 
paid to individual auditor characteristics in general (DeFond and Francis 2005; DeFond 
and Zhang 2014; Francis 2011; Nelson and Tan 2005) and auditor gender specifically 
(Birnberg 2011). Reflecting this interest and drawing on psychological literature, a 
number of researchers have provided evidence to suggest that females’ relatively lower 
tolerance of risk and use of more detailed information processing strategy affect audit-
related judgement and decision-making. For instance, prior studies document that 
female auditors are less tolerant of earnings management (Ittonen and Vähämaa 2013; 
Niskanen et al. 2011), issue more going concern opinions (Hardies et al. 2014) and 
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dedicate significantly more effort to examining evidence than male auditors (Hardies et 
al. 2015; O'Donnell and Johnson 2001; Ittonen and Peni 2012). Those reported gender 
differences in risk tolerance and information processing have significant implications 
for auditors’ judgements in the client acceptance process because they are likely to 
affect both the amount of evidence considered and the eventual assessment of risk, 
which may lead to significant variation in engagement decisions between male and 
female auditors. By recognising the important role of individual auditors in making 
client acceptance decisions, this thesis brings one key individual characteristic, gender, 
into the context of the client acceptance decision process.  
1.2 RESEARCH AIMS AND MOTIVATIONS 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate empirically whether the gender of 
engagement audit partners affects client acceptance decisions. In explaining the causes 
of gender differences such as risk attitudes and information processing, this study draws 
on social identity theory, which posits that gender as a category depends largely on 
context and that salient gender structures are likely to lead individuals to behave in a 
stereotypical manner (Kramer 2011; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999). Given that 
female auditors are in the numerical minority and that the auditor stereotype is typically 
male (Anderson-Gough et al. 2005; Hardies 2011; Kornberger et al. 2010), this study 
posits that gender-related behaviours are highly likely to manifest themselves in client 
acceptance decisions. Further, audit clients play an important role in engagement 
auditors’ career advancement and compensation schemes, but taking on risky clients 
could lead to potential litigation and sanctions. The subjective nature of the context 
suggests that two auditors in similar situations could reach opposing acceptance 
decisions depending on how they weigh the expected returns and any risks associated 
with a particular client. If systematic differences between female and male auditors 
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(such as risk perception and information processing) influence their judgements, female 
auditors would be expected to be more sensitive to negative evidence and these 
differences should be reflected in their client portfolios. Therefore, this study examines 
whether female audit partners’ clienteles are on the whole less risky than male audit 
partners’ clienteles by comparing the characteristics of the clients for each group.  
This study further investigates whether the association between auditor gender 
and clientele riskiness is more pronounced in the high-risk engagement context. 
Although a majority of the literature supports differences between females’ and males’ 
attitudes to risk and their information processing patterns, some researchers insist that 
the common assumption that females are more risk-averse than males warrants further 
and more sophisticated investigation (Hyde 2014; Nelson 2015). For instance, Nelson’s 
(2015) meta-analysis of 35 scholarly works examined statistically significant findings to 
estimate the effect size of gender differences and found that the genders are in fact 
much more similar in terms of outlook. In conclusion, she suggests that gender 
difference is apparent only at extreme levels of risk-taking decisions. Within the 
auditing context, the level of risk is a significant factor in determining individual 
auditors’ differences. The professional literature (D'Aquila et al. 2010) also suggests 
that high-risk engagement in particular requires auditors’ professional judgement in 
planning audit procedures that are highly tailored to that particular client and thus differ 
from the standardised audit manual and routine engagement assessment undertaken in 
the context of ordinary levels of risk.  In addition to audit firms’ formal process of client 
acceptance decisions, auditors’ work is subject to a set of principles and professional 
requirements. Given recently heightened regulation and its emphasis on auditor 
independence, auditors are expected to be more conservative when making client 
acceptance decisions. If auditors’ behaviours are mitigated by these trends and 
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professional norms, it is unclear to what extent the effects of gender differences would 
be discernable in overall decision-making or whether professional standards and firm 
norms have a more powerful influence than gender differences. This study therefore 
extends the prior research on gender effects in the audit context (Hardies et al. 2014) by 
considering situational factors that may motivate individual auditors’ differences or 
drive gender-related behaviours. More specifically, this study posits that differences 
between female and male auditors will be pronounced in the high-risk engagement 
context, in which a significant amount of professional judgement is inevitable and 
which are by definition more likely to pose the greatest risk to audit firms.  
1.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
This thesis makes use of the fact that Australia requires engagement partners to 
disclose their names in audit reports, making it possible to examine individual audit 
partner client portfolios. I analyse a sample of 2,767 firm-year observations on 
companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) from 2013 to 2014. The 
overall results indicate that on average female auditors have less risky clients in their 
client portfolios than male auditors. The results also show that the negative relationship 
between female auditor gender and the level of risk in clienteles is more pronounced 
among the riskiest group of clients. These findings may mean that while auditor gender 
differences influence the evaluation of engagement risk and thus client acceptance 
decisions, gender effects are more likely to be operative in the high-risk engagement 
context, where a more significant amount of professional judgement is required and 
which is likely to pose the greatest risk threat to auditors and firms. The results are 
robust for the balanced panel data and the 2013 and 2014 financial year subsamples.  
This study makes a number of contributions. First, it adds to the limited research 
on client acceptance decisions at the individual level of analysis, more specifically 
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extending prior studies on audit firms’ client portfolio decisions by including 
consideration of individual differences between auditors in assessing engagement risk. 
While the current study confirms prior experimental studies showing that individual 
auditors differ in evaluating or weighting risk factors, it also suggests that individual 
auditor differences do affect acceptance decisions. From the supply-side perspective, 
understanding that client acceptance decisions are made not only by firms but also by 
the engagement auditor in charge should provide additional insights into the audit 
process.  
Second, this study provides consistent evidence that gender may affect auditor 
judgements and decision-making (e.g., Gold et al. 2009; Hardies et al. 2014; Ittonen and 
Peni 2012) while also extending prior findings by incorporating contextual factors that 
may drive or exacerbate gender differences. While there has been increasing interest in 
gender differences in the auditing context, some researchers (Hardies 2011) have noted 
that merely describing differences based on psychological literature may be problematic 
in actually understanding gender differences. By drawing on social identity theory, this 
study takes into account the important role of context to explain why the gender-related 
behaviours observed may occur. Furthermore, the current study outlines the potentially 
important contextual factors that may magnify gender differences, thereby responding 
to calls by a number of researchers (Hyde 2014; Nelson 2015) to explore situational 
factors that maximise or minimise gender differences.  
Third, understanding how individual differences in cognitive processing and risk 
perception may influence evaluation of engagement risk level may be of interest to audit 
practitioners. Many public audit firms have investigated or implemented computer-
based audit decision aids (Bell et al. 2001), which have become even more important in 
the aftermath of major corporate collapses and the global financial crisis. Similarly, in 
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the most recent ASIC inspection report, “client acceptance and continuation” was 
recommended as one of the areas needing further improvement for the third consecutive 
year (2012–2014), suggesting both the importance of engagement management for audit 
firms and the difficulties they have experienced in addressing engagement pitfalls. If 
there is an individual difference in terms of risk level and cognitive processing, decision 
aid tools could take those differences into account and be tailored to assist specific 
auditors in assessing engagement risk factors. If implicit stereotypes are part of the 
organizational culture and subtle biases may unconsciously influence auditors’ 
judgement, diversity training and direct intervention such as mentoring programs may 
be appropriate. 
1.4 THESIS OUTLINE 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the 
theoretical framework and reviews the relevant literature on auditors’ client portfolio 
management and gender differences. Hypotheses are provided in Chapter 3, followed by 
a description of the sample and research methodology in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 reports 
the empirical results and Chapter 6 summarizes and concludes the thesis. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The literature review is organised into two main areas: client acceptance 
decisions and gender. Section 2.2 reviews the relevant literature on auditors’ client 
portfolio management and the association between client risk factors and auditors’ 
client acceptance decisions. Section 2.3 discusses the theoretical framework required to 
understand gender differences and reviews previous studies on gender differences in 
risk attitudes and information-processing strategies. This is followed by the role of 
gender differences in the context of auditing, in particular, an auditor’s judgement and 
decision on client acceptance in Section 2.4. The chapter is summarised in Section 2.5.  
 
2.2 ENGAGEMENT ACCEPTANCE DECISIONS FOR AUDIT 
The decision to accept or retain a client is made based on the evaluation of overall 
engagement risk, an integral part of the audit process that precedes any audit 
engagement (Colbert et al. 1996). Engagement acceptance decisions are vitally 
important to both audit firms and audit engagement partners.  Prospective clients 
ultimately affect the audit firms’ long-term financial viability (Asare et al. 2005; 
Chaney and Philipich 2002) and litigation exposure (Johnstone 2000; Shu 2000). In 
addition, new clients play an important role in auditors’ career advancement (Ayers and 
Kaplan 2003), but can pose a threat to individual audit partners’ objectivity (Auditing 
and Assurance Standards Board [AUASB], 2011). Auditing Standard ASQC 1 requires 
audit firms to establish appropriate policies and procedures for making the acceptance 
and continuance of client decisions (AUASB, 2013b). Accordingly, many audit firms 
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implement an engagement review process as a quality control mechanism to maintain 
consistently high audit quality. In the client acceptance decision context, a review 
partner functions as a risk monitoring mechanism to ensure that the decisions of the 
engagement partner—who may have different risk tolerance or potential self-interest—
are aligned with the firm’s overall objectives.  
Professional standards also highlight the important role of individual audit 
engagement partners in the client acceptance process. Before accepting a client, audit 
engagement partners are required to perform an initial investigation to identify whether 
the potential client might give rise to any threat to compliance with professional 
standards and ethical codes (Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board 
[APESB], 2010; AUASB, 2011). If the identified threats and risks are judged to be 
beyond an acceptable level, Australian audit and ethical standards ASA 200 and ASES 
110 require audit partners to decline such an audit engagement (APESB, 2010; 
AUASB, 2011). However, the acceptable level is defined relatively vaguely in the code 
as “a level at which a reasonable and an informed third party would be likely to 
conclude, weighing all the specific facts and circumstances available to the member at 
that time, that compliance with the fundamental principles is not compromised” 
(APESB, 2010, p. 4). The standards do not provide specific explanations of the type and 
volume of information that should be incorporated in the client acceptance decision, and 
require engagement partners to use professional judgement in determining the 
acceptable level (APESB, 2010; AUASB, 2011). The requirements of professional 
judgement and appropriate procedures suggest that client acceptance procedures depend 
on a number of factors, such as the client firms’ characteristics (e.g. level of risk) as 
well as audit firms and auditor related characteristics.  
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2.2.1 Engagement Risk and Audit Firms’ Client Portfolios 
Professional standards and previous literature suggest that once the potential 
engagement opportunity is identified, auditors gather relevant information about the 
potential client and evaluate the engagement risk to determine whether to submit an 
engagement proposal 1  (Johnstone and Bedard  2003; Khalil et al. 2011; AUASB, 
2013a). Three types of risks are embedded in engagement risk: (1) client’s business risk, 
which relates to the client’s survival and profitability; (2) audit risk, which is the 
auditors’ issuance of an inappropriate opinion on materially misstated financial 
statements; and (3) auditor’s business risk, which is the audit firm’s overall loss 
resulting from the engagement, such as loss of reputation, potential litigation or a lack 
of engagement profitability (Colbert et al. 1996; D'Aquila et al. 2010; Khalil et al. 
2011). Professional guidance and prior research also suggests that auditors evaluate 
their risk management strategies, such as staff assignment, industry expertise and 
extending the audit efforts, to determine whether any identified risks could be mitigated 
to an acceptable level. However, there is always a residual risk, as auditors’ risk 
management strategies cannot eliminate all client-related risk (Asare et al. 1994; 
Simunic and Stein 1990). For instance, client firms’ financial status and management 
integrity are not directly controllable by auditors’ risk management, whereas audit risk 
might be controlled by additional efforts such as substantive testing (Asare et al. 1994). 
In addition, litigation risk is considered a major concern to auditors, because loss of 
reputation can occur, regardless of auditors’ actual fault, from negative publicity (Huss 
and Jacobs 1991; Shu 2000; Catanach et al. 2011). Hence, auditors’ client acceptance 
                                                 
1 In terms of regulation, the difference between the two types of decisions for new clients and existing clients is not 
highlighted and both are considered as a whole; see Quality Control for Firms that Perform Audits and Reviews of 
Financial Reports and Other Financial Information, and Other Assurance Engagements pursuant to section 227B of 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001. 
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decisions are made within a complex context in which a trade-off between engagement 
risk and expected revenue is carefully examined in an inherently uncertain environment.  
Prior empirical research has examined changes in the risk profile of large audit 
firms’ client portfolios. This line of research shows audit firm-level evidence regarding 
how litigation risk has affected auditors’ client acceptance decisions. In the U.S, the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was enacted to reduce liability cost for 
auditors (Choi et al. 2004; Krishnan and Francis 2002). Accordingly, the pre-reform 
period from the late 1980s to the early 1990s is characterised as an environment of high 
risk of litigation for auditors, whereas the period after 1994 is comparatively low in that 
regard, providing a motivation to auditors to relax their risk management standards 
(Krishnan and Francis 2002; Jones and Raghunandan 1998).  
Jones and Raghunandan (1998) examine whether Big Eight audit firms responded 
to the heightened litigation risk in the late 1980s by comparing their client portfolios 
between 1987 and 1994. The results suggest that a large auditor’s client portfolio was 
significantly less risky in 1994 than in 1987. Specifically, by 1994, Big Eight audit firm 
clients were more likely to be financially distressed and in high-tech industries than 
1987 clients. Later, Krishnan and Francis (2002) documented the Big Six audit firms’ 
more relaxed risk management strategies, as evidenced by accepting financially risky 
clients and issuing fewer going concern opinions in the post-reform period than in the 
pre-reform period.  
Choi et al. (2004) examine changes in the riskiness of Big Six audit firms’ client 
portfolios over a more extensive period (1975–1999). The results suggest that financial 
riskiness of Big Six audit firm clients decreased in the 1985–1989 period but remained 
about the same from 1990 to 1995, which differs from previous findings. In comparing 
the different client groups, they also found that departing clients were more likely to be 
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financially distressed (as measured by bankruptcy models), have lower profit margins 
and be highly leveraged compared to the continuing client group.  
In a similar vein, Khalil (2011) documents the different audit firm portfolio 
management decisions made by Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms over the 2005–
2008 period. He found that companies audited by Big Four audit firms were less likely 
to report material weaknesses in internal control over financial reports than companies 
with non-Big Four auditors. In addition, companies with Big Four audit firms reported a 
lower number of material weaknesses regarding the firms’ control environment, such as 
the board of directors and audit committee, than did non-Big Four audit firm clients. 
This line of research views the pre-reform period, in which the litigation risk was high, 
as motivating auditors, especially large firms, to avoid high-risk clients due to 
reputational concerns (Reynolds and Francis 2000; DeFond and Zhang 2014; Krishnan 
and Francis 2002).  In addition, agency theory assumes that audit partners are 
homogeneous within a particular group, so that the largest auditors are essentially the 
same in terms of quality, appetite for risk, etc. (Francis 2011). However, such a narrow 
assumption is likely to discount potential individual differences.    
2.2.2 Audit Partners’ Client Acceptance Decisions 
While research provides firm-level evidence that audit firm characteristics, 
specifically auditor size, play an important role in auditors’ client acceptance decisions, 
little is known about how individual audit partners’ characteristics affect client 
acceptance decisions. However, as noted by Johnstone (2000) and Ayers and Kaplan 
(2003), the process by which an audit partner accepts a prospective or continues with an 
existing client involves not only objective risk assessment but also require auditors’ 
professional judgement on how those identified risks affect their compliance with 
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professional ethical requirements and cost-benefit considerations, which are both likely 
to vary with individual auditors (Bell et al. 2002).  
A limited number of experimental and field studies provide some insights into 
how individual audit partners make client acceptance decisions. Research shows that 
while client business risk and audit risk are negatively associated with an auditor’s 
determination in accepting a prospective client, individual auditors differ in terms of 
which factors are more significant for their decisions. 
In an experiment with 96 audit partners, Cohen and Hanno (2000) found that audit 
risk is negatively related to auditors’ client acceptance decisions and positively related 
to auditors’ recommendation of audit scope (substantive testing). Specifically, auditors’ 
judgements of client firms’ effectiveness of corporate governance (such as the 
monitoring function of the audit committee and the board of directors in addition to 
management integrity aspects like ethical attitudes) significantly affect their 
engagement decisions.  
In their field study, Johnstone and Bedard (2004) examined audit partners’ 
evaluation of engagement risk using a participating audit firm’s client acceptance and 
continuation decisions in 2000 and 2001. They found that discontinued clients, 
compared to continued clients, had higher audit risks as measured by the number of 
auditors’ high-risk responses to criteria questions relating to clients’ integrity issues and 
effectiveness of control environment. However, discontinued clients did not 
significantly differ from continued clients in terms of client business risk, as proxied by 
Zmijewski’s bankruptcy score and financial ratios such as return on assets and leverage. 
The authors argue that client firms’ business failure is a relatively rare concern, and that 
auditors may defend themselves against potential litigation risk by more conservative 
reporting, such as issuing a going concern opinion.  
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By contrast, Pratt and Stice (1994) find auditors are particularly sensitive to client 
firms’ financial difficulty when evaluating potential clients. Their findings suggest that 
clients’ financial condition and complex measures such as account structure, receivables 
and inventory as a percentage of total assets are positively related to auditor judgements 
of potential litigation likelihood. This is consistent with the arguments by Stice (1991) 
and Asare et al. (1994), who suggest that companies in financial difficulty increase 
engagement partner judgements regarding possible loss that may arise from litigation 
and additional audit efforts by using substantive testing and additional audit evidence. 
The premise of this argument is that financially risky companies generally increase the 
probability of investor and creditor losses; these parties might then be motivated to 
bring suit against the associated auditors in an attempt to recover their losses.  
Finally, in a survey study with 131 audit partners from Big Five audit firms, 
Johnstone (2001) examined the significance that engagement risk components played in 
their client acceptance decisions. Overall, client financial status, management integrity 
and litigation risk were found to be the most important components in determining 
client acceptance. However, specific risk factors were ranked differently by auditors 
with varying levels of experience. More experienced auditors tend to weigh audit risk 
factors like management integrity heavily, whereas less experienced auditors place more 
emphasis on the relationship between the client and the prior auditor, and clients’ 
financial risk.  
Research also shows that when risky clients are assessed, individual auditors 
differ with respect to applying risk adaptation strategies. Johnstone (2000) proposed a 
model for the client acceptance process in which various engagement risk factors are 
evaluated and risk management strategies are considered based on auditors’ perceived 
level of engagement risk and profitability. He experimentally tested the model with 137 
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audit partners and found that auditors made client acceptance decisions based on client-
related risk factors such as financial status, industry and internal control systems. 
However, the auditors did not use risk management strategies like assigning an industry 
expert or extending the scope of the evidence search to bring high-risk clients down to a 
more acceptable level, which implies auditors’ risk avoidance.  
Using proprietary data from a large auditing firm, Johnstone and Bedard (2003) 
test the client acceptance model and found that companies with going concern risks and 
fraud risks were less likely to be accepted by the audit partners. Contrary to Johnstone’s 
finding (2000), risk management strategies such as planned higher audit fees and 
assigning industry experts, moderated those negative relations.  
Taken together, while overall engagement risk is inversely related to the 
likelihood of an auditor’s acceptance decision, auditors appear to differ in terms of 
which risk components are relatively more important for their client acceptance 
decisions. Nevertheless, different components of engagement risk appear to be 
intertwined. For instance, management integrity is associated with the reliability of the 
client firm’s financial reporting (Huss and Jacobs 1991; Cohen and Hanno 2000), 
thereby decreasing the likelihood of financial misstatement, which is an audit risk. 
Likewise, clients in poor financial condition could provide the opportunity for 
management to engage in misleading financial reporting and cause investor losses (Pratt 
and Stice 1994; Choi et al. 2004), thereby increasing litigation risk and thus the 
auditors’ business risk.  
Second, when risky clients are assessed, individual auditors also differ with 
respect to applying risk adaptation strategies to bring them to a more acceptable risk 
level. A similar level of risky clients may be categorised as excessively risky depending 
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on how engagement partners weigh expected costs in terms of personal reputation and 
litigation against anticipated revenue.  
2.2.3 Factors Affecting Auditors’ Client Acceptance Decisions 
Various factors can affect an auditor’s judgement and decision in accepting audit 
clients. It has been suggested that individual auditors have a strong economic incentive 
for client retention and extending client bases, as compensation schemes and career 
advancement are closely linked to expanding the new client base within audit firms 
(Hay et al. 2007; Bedard et al. 2008; Fu et al. 2015; Francis 2011; Hardies et al. 2014; 
Nelson and Tan 2005). Recent archival research also provides evidence that audit 
partners’ client bases play a significant role in compensation schemes (e.g., Hay et al. 
2007; Fu et al. 2015). In an analytical review, Bedard et al. (2008) note that the primary 
concern in the pre-engagement phase is that economic incentives may induce audit 
partners to take on excessively risky clients. In this regard, a review partner is viewed as 
a monitoring mechanism similar to the agency and principal logic in the client 
acceptance decision context, since a review partner is incentivised to deliver effective 
monitoring and assure joint responsibility for accepting risky clients (Ayers and Kaplan 
2003; Emby and Favere-Marchesi 2010).   
For example, an experimental study by Ayers and Kaplan (2003) examined 
whether a review partner’s risk evaluation was affected by the engagement partner’s 
evaluation. In their experimental setting, participating auditors were provided 
hypothetical clients with the engagement partners’ evaluations, which were manipulated 
either by being consistent with the underlying factors or overly favourable compared to 
the facts. Ayers and Kaplan (2003) found that auditors tended to be more conservative 
when they assessed the overly favourable engagement partner’s work papers, thereby 
reflecting the effectiveness of the review process. By contrast, other research has shown 
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that auditors who learn their superiors' views before making their own judgement are 
influenced by those views (Turner, 2001).  
In a similar vein, Gendron (2001) conducted interviews with engagement partners 
from three different Big Six audit firms in Canada and showed how the two conflicting 
incentives of commercial versus professional orientations affect auditors’ judgements 
and how audit firm policies affect their client acceptance decisions. He notes that audit 
firms’ formal client acceptance policies vary from standardised decision-making to 
flexible decision-making. However, in the context of accepting difficult clients, auditors 
appear to evaluate clients depending on their professional and personal orientations 
regardless of their firms’ written policies.  
As noted by Simunic and Stein (1990, 330), client acceptance decisions are based 
on auditors’ evaluations of the expected returns and costs and are hence “auditor-
specific”. Despite the importance of individual auditor judgements to client acceptance 
decisions, it remains relatively unknown how client risk factors affect engagement 
partners’ behaviours and how they weigh the different risk factors under conditions of 
uncertainty. On the one hand, client retention can improve their career advancement and 
improve their places in partnership or compensation schemes (Knechel et al. 2013; Fu et 
al. 2015). On the other hand, associating with risky clients could lead to potential 
litigation, so auditors’ personal reputations are at stake (Krishnan and Francis 2002; 
Bell et al. 2001; Shu 2000). That is, two auditors in similar situations could come to 
different conclusions depending on how they weigh the expected returns and the costs 
or risks associated with a particular client. In the following section, individual auditors’ 
gender is considered as a factor that might influence an auditor’s judgement and 
decision in accepting clients.   
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2.3 GENDER 
Birnberg (2011) notes that there is comparatively little attention given to gender in 
accounting.  Gender may be an issue because some traits (e.g. taking risks and 
conservatism) have been reported to display significant gender-based differences 
outside the accounting domain. Those widely documented differences in risk attitude 
and information processing strategy are one of the fundamental factors in the auditing 
context, particularly in the client acceptance decision phase. As discussed in the 
previous section, client acceptance decisions involve auditors’ professional judgement 
in gathering client-related information and evaluating various risk cues imbedded in that 
information (Gul et al. 2013; Hardies et al. 2015). Therefore, gender differences in risk 
tolerance and information processing have significant implications for auditors’ 
judgements, because they may lead to significant variation between males and females 
in evaluating client risk at the preliminary engagement stage. This section discusses the 
theoretical framework required to understand how and why gender differences are 
consistently reported in certain domains, especially regarding risk tolerance and 
information processing strategies, and reviews previous research on gender differences 
in a variety of contexts.  
2.3.1 Gender through the Social Identity Theory 
Research in social psychology suggests that gender differences are primarily 
connected to social and environmental factors rather than anything inherently biological 
(Byrnes et al. 1999; Deaux and Major 1987; Crawford 2006).  
According to social identity theory, individuals classify both themselves and 
others using various social categorizations like gender, race, occupation and religious 
affiliation (Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999; Letherby and Earle 2003). Through this 
process of categorisation, a social group is created that comprises a set of individuals 
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who perceive themselves as similar to other members of the group (Letherby and Earle 
2003). The group identity tends to reflect similar viewpoints and behaviour expectations, 
such as socially appropriate masculine and feminine behaviours. This social expectation 
about behaviour influences individuals not only to think and behave in certain ways, but 
also to have a particular perspective about the behaviours of members of the out-group; 
when gender differences are involved, psychologists call that gender stereotyping (e.g., 
Stets and Burke 1996; Carr and Steele 2010). However, individuals hold several 
simultaneous social identities such as gender, race and occupation, so any individual’s 
identity is relevant to a variety of contexts that can have varying salience levels in 
different people.  
Gender, as a category, depends largely on the context, and the situations where 
gender stereotypes are most salient may lead to individuals behaving in a stereotypical 
manner (Kramer 2011; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999). Social psychologists note 
that gender identity becomes salient to a given context when one gender is a significant 
numerical minority in a group or a task is traditionally linked to a particular gender 
(e.g., Spencer et al. 2016; Stets and Burke 2000). The importance of context has been 
extensively studied in a variety of experimental settings. For example, gender 
differences in mathematics performance have been substantiated in several contexts. 
Spencer et al. (1999) found that females performed worse than males in a context in 
which they were exposed to the stereotype that males are better at math than females.  
However, there was no significant difference between females’ and males’ 
performance when they were told that gender differences in math performance had not 
been found. Other researchers have found that merely evoking social identity before a 
math test can lead individuals to behave in a manner consistent with the stereotype 
(Cadinu et al. 2005; Kiefer and Sekaquaptewa 2007; Bonnot and Croizet 2007). For 
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instance, female participants who were before taking an exam told that it would be used 
to compare males’ and females’ math ability performed much worse on average than 
females who took the test without any prior reference to gendered expectations; this 
latter group’s performance did not significantly differ from that of males (e.g., Kiefer 
and Sekaquaptewa 2007; Cadinu et al. 2005). These findings indicate that members of a 
target group of a negative stereotype can be adversely affected compared to their non-
stereotyped counterparts, thus supporting the proposition that gender differences may be 
mediated by social context.  
From the social identity perspective, the audit firm context appears to trigger 
gender stereotypes, as female auditors are in the numerical minority and the auditor 
stereotype is male. Although accounting firms, especially the Big Four (Deloitte, PwC, 
EY, KPMG), have made public commitments to promoting gender diversity in the 
workplace, research generally shows a higher proportion of males in auditing firms and 
that partner positions remain predominantly male 2  (Cullen and Christopher 2012; 
Dalton et al. 2014). Research into possible explanations of female underrepresentation 
in partner positions has highlighted the gendered nature of the audit profession (e.g., 
Anderson-Gough et al. 2005; Dalton et al. 2014; Hardies 2011). 
It has been argued that the qualification and characteristics ascribed to auditors 
have traditionally been linked to masculine stereotypes, such as assertiveness, 
decisiveness and confidence, while female communal stereotypes like passivity and 
caretaking are often read as a lack of career commitment that makes females ill-suited 
for the partner role (Anderson-Gough et al. 2005, 2006; Kornberger et al. 2010; Cullen 
and Christopher 2012). 
                                                 
2 In Australia, a recent Workplace Gender Equality Agency (WGEA) report shows that female employees represent 
more than 50 percent of the total employees in the accounting service sector (53% in 2014 and 52.7% in 2015). 
However, less than 10% of key management personnel are female in that sector (9.7% in 2014 and 7.5% in 2015), 
suggesting that “the most senior levels of management are heavily male-dominated” (Workplace Gender Equality 
Agency, 2016, p. 7).  
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Recent literature notes that the gendered nature of audit firms is perpetuated 
through informal organisational practices and patterns of interactions such that largely 
male-dominated networking practices are often subtle yet pervasive within an 
organisation (Anderson-Gough et al. 2006). Hardies (2011, 17) further concludes that 
the gender domination and masculine culture embedded in the audit firm context makes 
gender stereotypes salient, which in turn affects auditors’ judgements and ultimately 
“the production of audit quality”.  
Social identity theory posits that when the auditor identity is aligned with 
masculine stereotypes, female auditors may be concerned about being judged in line 
with gender stereotypes, which in turn could make them more susceptible to making 
mistakes (Carr and Steele 2010; Steele 1997; Stets and Burke 2000). Spencer et al. 
(2016, 421) note that when individuals experience stereotypes that are negatively 
relevant to their performance, they are likely to focus on monitoring themselves and 
“become vigilant to detect the sign of failure or errors”, resulting in more cautious and 
conservative behaviour in decision-making. Whether gender imbalance at the partner 
level is due to structural barriers (Abidin et al. 2009), subtle biases  (Dalton et al. 2014), 
or individuals’ own preferences (Morley et al. 2002), previous literature suggests that, 
overall, gender could have real salience in the audit firm context.    
2.3.2 Gender Differences 
Although the reported magnitude of gender differences varies among studies, 
different traits between females and males are commonly observed by researchers, such 
as risk attitudes and information processing strategies. Different behavioural and 
cognitive patterns are both discussed below. 
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2.3.2.1 Gender differences in information processing 
Under the so-called “selectivity hypothesis”, research shows that males and 
females differ in information processing styles (Meyers-Levy 1986); in this view, 
females are more comprehensive processors than males, so they employ most of the 
available information in forming their judgement. Males, however, tend to rely on 
heuristic devices and strongly represented informational cues, and their judgement is 
marked by simplified strategies that minimize cognitive effort.3 Information processing 
is one of the fundamental factors in the auditing context, as auditors must make 
judgements based on the evidence available.  
A number of experimental studies confirm that gender differences in information 
processing strategies could influence auditors’ judgements in various tasks (e.g.,Chung 
and Monroe 2001; O'Donnell and Johnson 2001; Gold et al. 2009). For instance, Chung 
and Monroe (2001) examined the effect of auditor gender and task complexity on 
accuracy, finding that female auditors achieved greater accuracy than male auditors in 
more complex inventory valuation tasks.  
O'Donnell and Johnson (2001) focused on task efficiency and reported that female 
auditors spent significantly more time than male auditors in completing an analytical 
procedure task in the context of a low level of client risk.  Gold et al. (2009) 
investigated gender differences in the management inquiry context, finding that male 
auditors were on average more persuaded by unverified client-provided explanations 
than female auditors. The authors attribute the results to females’ comparatively lower 
risk tolerance levels and need for more detailed information before making judgements.  
In contrast, Breesch and Branson (2009) investigated the effect of auditor gender 
on audit opinion by analysing the final exams of auditor trainees in Belgium, but 
                                                 
3 Heuristic devices represent an individual’s tendency to rely on the probability of occurrence, previous experiences 
in similar contexts or readily available information when making judgements (Meyers-Levy, 1986). 
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reported no significant differences in finding potential misstatements between female 
and male auditors in the presence of time constraints. The authors suggest that while 
female auditors have an advantage over male auditors in analysing more complex 
situations due to their comprehensive information processing, time pressure in the exam 
setting may lessen that advantage. As Chung and Monroe (2001) suggested, although 
accurate judgements are preferable, accuracy can be traded off against efficiency 
because maintaining accuracy is more costly given today’s increased competition in the 
market for audit services (Bell et al. 2001; Johnstone et al. 2004). While more 
comprehensive information processing using the maximal available informational cues 
may facilitate female auditors’ accurate judgements, it can also be less efficient, foster 
excessive audit efforts and consequently produce high audit costs.  
Hence, the documented gender differences in information processing may not 
necessarily be value-laden in the auditing context, but simply confirm females’ 
tendency to employ more thorough information processing styles, regardless of whether 
tasks are simple or complex. From this perspective, the selectivity hypothesis not only 
explains gender differences in information processing strategies but also appears to 
accommodate the gender differences in risk-taking behaviours.  
2.3.2.2 Gender differences in risk attitudes 
It is a widely acknowledged stereotype that females are on average more risk-
averse than males4. For instance, Byrnes et al. (1999) conducted a meta-analysis of 150 
studies on gender differences in risk-taking behaviours in various domains and 
concluded that in the general population males are more likely on average to engage in 
risky behaviours than females. Researchers suggest that, to a large extent, gender 
differences observed in risk-taking behaviours are driven by the differences in 
                                                 
4 For example, research in psychology (Byrnes, Miller and Schafer, 1999), social science (Christman, Jasper, Sontam 
and Cooil, 2007), and gender studies (Lyonette and Crompton, 2008) support this contention. 
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perception of risks and focus framing in the decision-making context, i.e. whether a 
decision-maker stresses potential losses or gains (Byrnes et al. 1999; Magar et al. 2008; 
Harris et al. 2006; Olsen and Cox 2001; Croson and Gneezy 2009).  
Risk and return trade-offs are cognitive processes in which perceived risks and 
expected benefits are subjectively assessed and valued (Borghans et al. 2009). Using the 
risk-return framework, females are found to put greater emphasis on potential loss or 
risk while males are likely to put emphasis on expected benefits (e.g.,  Borghans et al. 
2009; Christman et al. 2007). This predisposition to focus on loss or gain is observed in 
many domains, but especially in financial decision-making contexts (Olsen and Cox 
2001; Powell and Ansic 1997; Speelman et al. 2013; e.g., Hohnisch et al. 2014). Croson 
and Gneezy’s (2009) review of gender differences in risk preferences from the 
economics literature found that females tend to place more focus on the potential to lose 
money than do males when making investment decisions.  
The effect of gender differences is mixed when professional subgroups are 
examined. In their survey study of Chartered Financial Analysts (CFAs), Olsen and Cox 
(2001) pointed out that female investment managers tend to emphasize downside 
variation or potential loss more than their male counterparts. On the other hand, using a 
sample of U.S. mutual fund managers, Atkinson et al. (2003) did not find significant 
differences between female and male fund managers regarding the characteristics of the 
funds they managed. Gender differences have also been studied extensively in the 
management literature. As firms’ accounting-related policies or decisions rest with their 
chief financial officers (CFOs), researchers posit that gender variations in risk attitudes 
may lead to different corporate financial decisions.  
A number of empirical studies examine the effect of the CFO on different 
corporate financial decisions. Using a sample of Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 1500 
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companies during the period 1988–2007, Francis et al. (2015a) found that after a female 
CFO replaced a male CFO, the level of conservatism in financial reporting increased 
significantly, as measured by companies’ market-to-book ratio and accrual measures. 
Other studies have reported that companies with female CFOs are less likely to issue 
debt (Huang and Kisgen 2013), are associated with reduced aggressiveness in the area 
of taxation (Francis et al. 2015b) and have more income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals (Barua et al. 2010; Peni and Vähämaa 2010), suggesting that female executives 
are relatively less tolerant of risk and therefore adopt more conservative accounting 
strategies. Nevertheless, Ye et al. (2010) did not find significant differences between 
companies with female and male CFOs in terms of conservative financial reporting 
strategies. 
Extensive studies have also documented how female directors on the corporate 
board affect company decision-making and thus corporate performance. Using a sample 
of U.S. firms over the period 2001–2007, Hutchinson and Gul (2013) found that gender-
diverse boards are positively associated with the accuracy of, and negatively associated 
with, divergence from analysts’ earnings forecasts. The authors suggested that the 
presence of female directors on a board could improve effectiveness by expanding 
cognitive resources and insights and hence lead to higher-quality corporate disclosure, 
which in turn facilitates the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. Previous studies have 
indicated that the presence of female directors on a board is positively associated with 
corporate performance, while having a higher rate of female directors is on average 
negatively related to the viability of firms’ stock market returns (Jane Lenard et al. 
2014), and positively associated with higher earnings quality (Gul et al. 2011; Krishnan 
and Parsons 2008) 
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 Finally, using a sample of U.S. firms for the period 1996–2003, Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) showed that the very presence of female directors enhanced monitoring 
functions, as female directors were likely to sit on monitoring committees; they have 
better attendance records at board meetings and even improve male directors’ 
attendance records. However, increases in female representation on boards are 
negatively associated with firms’ profitability. The authors argue that while gender-
diverse boards generally enhance firm values by additional monitoring roles, excessive 
monitoring could have a negative impact on firms’ value.  
It thus appears that prior research generally supports the positive role of female 
directors in effective corporate governance and firm performance. Such beneficial 
effects, however, might arise because of the varied perspectives and cognitive resources 
due to group diversity or female directors’ different management styles and 
characteristics, including more independent (Adams and Ferreira 2009) and 
conservative characteristics (Francis et al. 2015a). 
Although gender differences are context-specific, the majority of the literature has 
supported differences between females’ and males’ attitudes to risk and their 
information processing patterns. However, some researchers have insisted that the 
common assumption that females are more risk-averse than males warrants further 
investigation. For instance, in a review of 46 meta-analyses, Hyde (2005) demonstrated 
that females and males are in fact much more similar in terms of outlook. He examined 
statistically significant findings in psychological studies to estimate the effect size of 
gender differences,5 with the results suggesting that almost 80 percent of effect sizes for 
the reported gender differences were small or even nearly zero. Further analysis 
                                                 
5 Effect size is “a measure of how large the difference is in the study of gender differences” (Hyde 2014, p. 375). 
Cohen’s d is generally used to evaluate the magnitude of gender differences, which is equal to “the mean score for 
males minus the mean score for females divided by the within group standard deviations. The effect size is then 
interpreted from small to moderate and large depends on the estimated score, range from 0.00 to 1.00”. (See Nelson, 
2015; Hyde 2014; Zell, Krizan and Teeter, 2015).  
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revealed a number of potential moderators of gender differences, such as time period 
and culture. The intersection of gender and ethnicity showed that reported gender 
differences in self-esteem are likely to be driven by differences in the subsample of 
white males, so the magnitude of gender differences in risk perception is not identical 
across different ethnicity groups; the self-esteem of non-white males may not be 
significantly different from that of females relative to white males.  
Similarly, Nelson (2015) examined statistically significant research in a meta-
analysis of 35 scholarly works in economics, finance and decision science. Testing the 
substantive significance of these studies, she found that results were more mixed and 
overlapped to a greater extent than first inferred.6 Nelson (2015) suggests that it is likely 
that significant gender difference is apparent only at extreme levels of risk-taking 
decisions. Taken together, situational factors within an audit context that could motivate 
individual auditors to behave in a manner consistent with gender stereotypes appear to 
warrant further investigation. Hardies (2011, 13) suggests that while gender differences 
are likely to be elicited within the audit context, “future research should also try to 
understand under what precise circumstances gender makes a difference”.  
2.4 GENDER DIFFERENCES IN AUDITING CONTEXT 
Following the call for more research investigating how auditor characteristics 
influence their judgements and decision-making (DeFond and Zhang 2014; DeFond and 
Francis 2005), a number of researchers have examined gender effects in the audit 
context. By drawing on psychological literature, researchers posit that gender-based 
differences such as risk attitudes and conservatism exist, which may lead to different 
audit judgements.  
                                                 
6 Standardized differences in means are less than one standard deviation, and the degree of overlap between male and 
female distributions generally exceeds 80%. 
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Using a sample of Finnish and Swedish firms during the period 2005–2007, 
Ittonen and Vähämaa (2013) investigated the association between accrual quality and 
auditor gender. They documented that companies with female audit partners had smaller 
abnormal accruals than companies with male audit partners, indicating that female 
auditors are less tolerant of earnings management and are thus more effective at 
constraining opportunistic behaviours by management. Using a sample of private 
Finnish companies, Niskanen et al. (2011) also provided evidence that female audit 
partners are associated with less opportunistic earnings management. The authors 
attributed the results to female auditors’ more conservative characteristics.   
Using a sample of listed companies in Finland, Denmark and Sweden, Ittonen and 
Peni (2012) reported that female auditors charged higher audit fees than male auditors. 
Ittonen and Peni (2012) proposed that female auditors’ lower risk tolerance may lead to 
risk premiums in the audit engagement or more intensive audit efforts that increase 
audit fees. Other research into the effects of auditor gender on audit quality measured by 
the propensity to issue a Going Concern Opinion (GCO) offers mixed results. Using a 
sample of private Belgian companies, Hardies et al. (2014) found that female auditors 
were more likely than male auditors to issue a GCO, and that this effect was stronger 
with high-risk clients. On the other hand, using a sample of Australian listed companies, 
Hossain and Chapple (2012) found that female auditors are less likely to issue a GCO, 
attributing this result to female auditors’ aversion to the risk of auditor replacement, as 
client firms typically want to receive clean opinions. 
2.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
Client acceptance decisions are made based on an evaluation of overall 
engagement risk, which precedes any audit engagement. While prior research shows 
firm-level evidence that audit firm characteristics, particularly auditor size, play an 
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important role in auditors’ client acceptance decisions, little is known about how 
individual auditors’ characteristics affect client acceptance decisions. Limited empirical 
research shows that individual auditors vary in terms of how they weigh the different 
risk factors associated with prospective clients. However, to the best of my knowledge, 
the potential effect of individual characteristics on the client acceptance decision has not 
been addressed in the literature. The importance of individual auditors’ characteristics 
as a supply-side input to the audit quality has recently been highlighted by both 
regulators and audit research (Financial Reporting Council, 2008; Gul et al. 2013). 
Furthermore, the recent research has documented auditor gender differences in risk 
attitudes and information-processing strategies in the context of auditing. Client 
acceptance decisions involve auditors evaluating overall engagement risk based on the 
collected client-related information. These reported gender differences in risk attitudes 
and cognitive patterns are particularly important in client acceptance decisions. This 
thesis aims to fill the abovementioned gaps in the literature.     
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Chapter 3: Hypotheses Development 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In light of social identity theory and gender differences in information processing 
and risk attitude, two hypotheses are developed to examine the gender differences in 
client acceptance decisions. Section 3.2.1 outlines individual differences in risk 
behaviour and client portfolio management. The first hypothesis, presented in Section 
3.2.2, argues that client portfolios of female auditors are less risky than those of male 
auditors, while the second hypothesis, laid out in Section 3.2.3, posits that the 
conservative attitude of female auditors in terms of client risk is magnified in high-risk 
contexts. A summary of the chapter follows in Section 3.3. 
 
3.2 GENDER DIFFERENCES IN CLIENT ACCEPTANCE DECISIONS 
The decision to accept or retain a client is based on evaluating overall engagement 
risk. It is an integral part of the auditing process that precedes any audit engagement and 
ultimately affects the audit firms’ long-term financial viability (Simunic and Stein 1990; 
Chaney and Philipich 2002; Johnstone 2000; Pratt and Stice 1994). In addition, audit 
clients play an important role in auditors’ career advancement (Ayers and Kaplan 2003), 
and can pose a threat to individual audit partners’ objectivity (AUASB, 2011). 
Prior research has documented the significant role that auditor size, as 
distinguished by being a Big N versus a non-Big N firm, plays in client acceptance 
decisions and overall engagement risk management. However, the results are mixed. 
Some research shows that Big N audit firms are more likely to avoid risky engagements, 
as evidenced by resigning from high-risk clients (Catanach et al. 2011) or adjusting 
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their client portfolios in response to increased litigation risk (Choi et al. 2004). 
However, other research suggests that large audit firms may spread a given client’s risk 
over their broader client bases (Krishnan and Francis 2002; Shu 2000). Big N firms also 
have more resources to invest in industry expertise and technologies, which enables 
them to serve riskier clients (Catanach et al. 2011). 
While most studies have examined audit firms’ client portfolio management 
primarily through the lens of trade-offs between the expected revenue from engagement 
and expected engagement loss (i.e., litigation cost, reputation loss, etc.), little is known 
about how individual audit partners’ characteristics affect the client acceptance 
decisions.  
Prior research suggests that client acceptance decisions involve audit partners’ 
evaluation of various client-related risks and professional judgements, which is more 
likely to vary from individual to individual (Bell et al. 2001; Johnstone and Bedard 
2003). Research also indicates that gender differences among auditors influence 
judgement and audit effort, thus leading to different audit opinions (Hardies et al. 2014) 
or variations in audit fees (Ittonen and Peni 2012).  
In the next section, I develop hypotheses on how gender-based differences in risk 
attitudes and cognitive information processing link to client acceptance decisions. 
Further, I extend previous research on gender differences in the auditing context by 
including the situational factor of high-risk engagement, which could highlight 
individual auditors’ gender-related behaviours. 
3.2.1 Individual Auditors’ Differences in Risk Behaviour and Client Portfolios 
During the portfolio management process, auditors gather the relevant client-
related information and evaluate engagement risk to decide whether to submit a 
proposal to provide audit services for a prospective client that is seeking audit services 
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(Johnstone 2000; Branson 2007). Many public audit firms implement a comprehensive 
set of policies and procedures to maintain consistent audit quality and guide individual 
partners who may be self-interested or have different risk tolerances (Bell et al. 2002). 
However, precisely what constitutes audit decision evidence and the scope of audit 
procedures are determined by the audit engagement partners who undertake the audit 
procedure. Likewise, Asare et al. (1994, 176) noted that “although an audit firm may 
have a particular risk tolerance at the conceptual level, the actual risk assessments are 
made at the individual audit partner level who have different risk tolerances”.  
3.2.2 Gender Differences in Risk Assessment and Information Processing 
Research shows that males and females differ in information processing styles, in 
what is known as the “selectivity hypothesis” (Meyers-Levy 1986). In this view, 
females are more comprehensive information processors than males, so they employ 
most of the available information in forming their judgement. Males, however, tend to 
rely on heuristic devices and are characterised by simplified processors minimizing 
cognitive effort.7 Prior audit research also provides evidence that gender differences in 
information processing may influence the audit process, showing that female auditors 
tend to employ the maximum available information, regardless of whether tasks are 
simple or complex, while male auditors engage in relatively simplified information 
processing (O'Donnell and Johnson 2001; Chung and Monroe 2001). In their 
experimental study, Gold et al. (2009) show that females’ comparatively lower risk 
tolerance levels are associated with a need for more detailed information before making 
judgements. Hence, the different cognitive patterns between males and females also 
appear to accommodate gender differences in risk-taking behaviours.  
                                                 
7 Heuristic devices represent an individual’s tendency to rely on the probability of occurrence, experiences in similar 
contexts or readily available information when making judgements (Meyers-Levy 1986; Meyers-Levy and Loken 
2015; Gold et al. 2009). 
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Research in psychology (Byrnes et al. 1999),  social science (Christman et al. 
2007) and gender studies (Lyonette and Crompton 2008) support the contention that 
females are stereotyped as more risk-averse than males. Research suggests that, to a 
large extent, gender differences observed in risk-taking behaviours are driven by 
differences in perception of risks and whether a decision-maker stresses potential losses 
or gains in the decision-making context, a process known as focus framing. Females’ 
predisposition to focus on loss and other conservative tendencies are observed 
especially in the financial decision-making context, where the task is socially viewed as 
masculine (Olsen and Cox 2001; Harris et al. 2006). Behavioural economic studies have 
documented that female investors tend to overestimate small probabilities of losing and 
are more sensitive to ambiguity, leading to their holding portfolios with less volatile 
returns than males (Christman et al. 2007). Gender difference in risk attitude is observed 
even when the participants are financial professionals. Olsen and Cox (2001) point out 
that female Chartered Financial Analysts (CFAs) tend to put greater emphasis on 
downside variation or potential loss than their male counterparts in investment settings.  
While the bulk of the literature has documented females’ tendency to take less 
risk than males in general, no gender differences or females’ elevated risk-taking 
behaviours have been documented in certain contexts (i.e., within same gender group, 
(e.g., Booth and Nolen 2012; Croson and Gneezy 2009). According to social identity 
theory, individuals hold multiple social identities including gender, race and occupation, 
and each identity is relevant to a variety of contexts that can have varying salience 
levels in different people. Therefore, gender as a category depends largely on the 
context, as do specific situations in which gender stereotypes are most salient and may 
lead to individuals behaving in a stereotypical manner (Ridgeway and Correll 2004; 
Letherby and Earle 2003; Stets and Burke 2000). Social identity theory posits that 
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gender identity becomes salient to a given context when one gender is a significant 
numerical minority in a group or a task traditionally linked to a particular gender (Stets 
and Burke 2000). For example, Carr and Steele (2010) show that females become more 
risk-averse in investment decision-making compared to males in a context in which they 
were exposed to the stereotype that males are better at investment decisions than 
females.  
From the social identity perspective, the audit firm context does appear to trigger 
gender stereotypes, as female auditors are in a numerical minority and the auditor 
stereotype is positively linked to males (Anderson-Gough et al. 2005; Kornberger et al. 
2010; Hardies 2011). Recent literature notes that the gendered nature of audit firms is 
perpetuated through informal organisational practices such as largely male-dominated 
networking practices that are often subtle yet pervasive within an organisation 
(Anderson-Gough et al. 2006; Lupu 2012). Female and male auditors thus might have 
meaningfully different experiences within seemingly identical audit contexts; 
consequently, gender differences are likely to be observed in assessing engagement risk. 
Prior empirical research provides evidence of females’ relatively lower tolerance for 
risk, showing that companies with female CFOs are associated with reduced 
aggressiveness in the area of taxation (Francis et al. 2015a) and have more income-
decreasing discretionary accruals (Barua et al. 2010). Similarly, recent audit research 
demonstrates that companies audited by female auditors are associated with less 
opportunistic earnings management (Niskanen et al. 2011), intensive audit efforts 
(Ittonen and Peni 2012) and receive more GCOs (Hardies et al. 2014). 
As discussed above, client acceptance decisions involve the engagement audit 
partners’ evaluations of expected returns and costs. On the one hand, client retention 
can improve their career advancement and improve their places in partnership or 
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compensation schemes (Knechel et al. 2013; Fu et al. 2015). On the other hand, taking 
on risky clients could lead to potential litigation, so auditors’ personal reputations are at 
stake (Krishnan and Francis 2002; Bell et al. 2001; Shu 2000)two auditors in very 
similar situations could thus come to different audit engagement decisions, depending 
on how each weighs the expected returns and costs or risks associated with a particular 
client. Females’ detailed information processing may lead them to be more aware of the 
inherent risk implied in clients (Gold et al. 2009; O'Donnell and Johnson 2001; Chung 
and Monroe 2001). Alternatively, female auditors’ greater emphasis on negative 
outcomes may lead them to evaluate the potential costs as much higher than male 
auditors. In either case, it is expected that female auditors are less likely to engage with 
risky clients. Male audit partners, on the other hand, may be more likely to overlook 
clients’ inherent risk because of their tendency to employ simplified information 
processing. Additionally, male auditors’ positively biased risk evaluation may lead them 
to put greater emphasis on potential revenue than on downside risk with prospective 
clients. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Client portfolios of female auditors are on average less risky than male auditors. 
 
3.2.3 The Level of Engagement Risk in Client Acceptance Decision Context 
Although gender differences are context-specific, the majority of the literature 
supports differences between females’ and males’ information processing patterns and 
their attitudes toward risk. However, some researchers have posited that females’ 
tendency to be more risk-averse than males warrants further, more nuanced 
investigation. According to Hyde (2005) meta-analysis, which examines the effect sizes 
of gender differences, females and males are in fact much more similar in terms of 
outlook. Hyde’s further investigation into potential moderators showed that gender 
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difference in risk perception is not identical across different ethnic groups. Similarly, 
Nelson (2015) examined statistically significant research in a meta-analysis of 35 
scholarly works in economics, finance and decision science. Testing the substantive 
significance of these studies, she found that results were more mixed and overlapped to 
a greater extent than first inferred. 8  Nelson (2015) suggests that it is likely that 
significant gender differences are apparent only at the extremes of risk-taking decisions.  
Within the auditing context, the level of risk is a significant factor in determining 
individual auditors’ differences. Auditors’ client acceptance decisions not only involve 
evaluating risk based on the evidence but also require auditors to make professional 
judgements using risk management strategies to determine whether any identified risks 
are acceptable (APESB, 2010; AUASB, 2011). The professional literature also suggests 
that high-risk engagement calls on audit partners’ professional judgement to plan or 
design audit procedures that are tailored to those high-risk clients and thus differ from 
the standardised audit manual and process (D'Aquila et al. 2010). Therefore, a high 
level of engagement risk is an important situational factor that may magnify the 
differences in client portfolios between female and male audit partners. A survey study 
of professional investment managers by Olsen and Cox (2001) concludes that while 
gender differences in risk perception give rise to different portfolio recommendations 
for clients, these differences are most significant for assets and portfolios at risk 
extremes. Steel (2010, p. 1412) further argues that when individuals within minority 
groups in professional occupations, such as female auditors, are under stereotype threats, 
they “assess risk and loss particularly negatively”. Prior research also shows that while 
large auditors are generally reluctant to associate with financially risky clients as 
measured by financial distress, accounting ratios or market risk measurements, auditors 
                                                 
8 Standardized differences in means are less than one standard deviation, and the degree of overlap between male and 
female distributions generally exceeds 80%. 
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differ in applying risk management strategies in the high-risk engagement context 
(Johnstone and Bedard 2004; Choi et al. 2004; Krishnan and Francis 2002). For 
example, in an experimental study, Johnstone (2000) found that auditors made client 
acceptance decisions based on clients’ financial status and internal control systems but 
did not accept those considered as high-risk clients. However, a field study by 
Johnstone and Bedard (2003) found that risk management strategies such as assigning 
industry experts or increasing audit scopes moderated the negative relation between 
risky clients and auditors’ likelihood of acceptance. 
Given females’ sensitivity to ambiguity and negative outcomes, it is more likely 
that female auditors evaluate high-risk clients as riskier and judge it more costly to 
mitigate those risks than males do. In addition, male auditors’ tendency to focus on gain 
may emphasize client retention incentives and lead them to applying risk management 
strategies. This leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2: The negative relation between female audit partners and riskiness of the 
clienteles depends on high-risk engagement. 
 
3.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter outlines the study’s theoretical framework and presents two testable 
hypotheses based on the links between gender differences in information processing and 
risk attitudes to auditors’ client acceptance decisions. In response to the research 
questions, this thesis answers whether and how individual auditor gender influences 
auditors’ judgements and decision-making in the preliminary engagement phase, the 
client acceptance context. Specifically, it tests whether and how gender-related 
differences may impact on the amount and scope of audit evidence employed in 
evaluating overall engagement risk associated with prospective audit clients, and 
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therefore result in different client portfolios between female and male auditors. First, 
building on social identity theory, it is predicted that gender differences are more likely 
to be observed in the auditing context, hypothesizing that female auditors’ clienteles are 
less risky than male auditors’ clienteles. Second, it hypothesizes that the negative 
relation between female auditors and client riskiness depends on the degree of riskiness 
in any engagement decision.  
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Chapter 4: Data and Research Design 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the sample selection, variable measurements and research 
method used to test two proposed hypotheses. Section 4.2 outlines data sources and sample 
selection procedures. Section 4.3 describes the research design by illustrating the client 
acceptance model (Section 4.3.1), three proxy measurements of engagement risk and control 
variables (Section 4.3.2), and the quantile regression model (Section 4.3.3). The chapter is 
summarised in Section 4.4. 
 
4.2 DATA SAMPLE SELECTION 
The sample for this study consists of the firms listed on the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) from 2013 to 20149. Data on listed companies with financial information is 
sourced from the Morningstar database. Data on audit fees and engagement partners are 
retrieved from the Connect 4 database, and cross-checked with the SIRCA and Morningstar 
databases for confirmation.  
Australian listed companies are required to disclose auditor remuneration in the 
financial statements as stipulated by Australian Accounting Standards AASB 1054 (AASB, 
2011). The disclosure should include nature of all services (audit and non-audit services) and 
amounts for each type of services performed by each auditor during the financial reporting 
period (AASB, 2011). Furthermore, Australian Auditing Standards ASA700 requires the 
engagement partner to disclose their name with signature in the audit report (AUASB, 2013). 
Accordingly, data on audit fees and the engagement auditor name are hand-collected from 
                                                 
9 This Masters study uses a relatively short time period ending in 2014, which is the most recent available data. 
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financial statements and audit reports. Auditors’ gender is further identified from the audit 
firms’ websites based on their full name. In cases where auditor gender is not provided on the 
company’s website, auditors’ gender is found on social network sites (e.g. LinkedIn) and 
media releases from audit firms. 
The initial sample of 3,797 firm-year observations is obtained from the Morningstar 
database. Following prior research, companies from the financial sectors (two digit GICS 
code 40) are excluded from the sample to address their different reporting requirements (Xu et 
al. 2013). Companies with incomplete financial data are also removed, resulting in a sample 
of 3,088 observations with financial information. After reviewing the annual reports, 
companies that provide only preliminary financial reports, foreign registrants, companies with 
missing audit fee data, and companies whose functional currency is not Australian Dollars are 
further excluded. Finally, companies with double audit partners, no audit partner names in the 
audit reports, as well as non-identifiable audit partners’ gender are dropped from the sample. 
This elimination process yielded a final sample of 2,767 firm-year observations representing 
1,488 Australian listed companies. The sample selection procedure is outlined in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1:  Summary of Sample Selection 
 
Description 
Total number of 
observations 
2013 2014 
Number of listed companies during the financial year  3,797 1,864 1,933 
Exclusions 
   
    Companies in the financial sectors (GICS code 40) 352 165 187 
    Companies with insufficient financial information 357 158 199 
    Foreign companies 131 64 67 
    Functional currency is not $AUD 85 43 42 
    Non 12-month reporting period 36 5 31 
    Under Suspension 27 13 14 
    No audit fee data  25 16 9 
    No auditor name 6 2 4 
    Gender cannot be identified 9 7 2 
    Double auditor signed 2 1 1 
Number of Observations in the Final sample                                                                                                      2,767 1,390 1,377
 
 
4.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.3.1 Client Acceptance Model 
Prior research suggests that financially stressed clients are associated with the likelihood 
of material misstatement occurring in the financial statement (audit risk), as they are more 
likely to have incentives to manage earnings (Krishnan and Francis 2002; Schroeder and 
Hogan 2013; Gaeremynck et al. 2008). Similarly, research on audit firms’ client portfolio 
changes and auditor resignation demonstrates that clients’ poor financial condition increases 
auditor judgements of litigation risk (Choi et al. 2004; Johnstone 2000; Krishnan and 
Krishnan 1997; Simunic and Stein 1990; Krishnan and Francis 2002), thereby also increasing 
auditors’ perceived engagement risk. Accordingly, the proposed hypotheses were tested by 
comparing the financial risk profile of client portfolios between female and male audit 
partners.  First, to test whether average female audit partenrs’ clienteles are less risky than 
male audit partners’ clienteles (H1), the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model is 
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used. Second, the quantile regression is estimated to test whether auditors’ gender-related 
difference is prominent in the high-risk engagement context (H2) by fitting the 20th quantile 
lines in the upper or lower tails of the distribution. 
The association between riskiness of auditors’ clienteles and the individual auditor 
characteristic of gender is tested based on the model used in Choi et al. (2004), who 
investigated whether large audit firms respond to heightened audit litiagtion liability by 
comparing the riskiness of Big Six audit firms’ client portfolios over time during the sample 
period. They regress multiple measures of client riskiness – three summary measures of 
financail distress and a number of disaggregated accounting ratios – on a set of indicator 
variables for time periods, along with control variables10. In this study, three financail risk 
measures, including a summary measure of financial distress and two fianncial ratios are used 
as proxy variables for client riskiness11.  
 In order to test whether average female audit partners’ clienteles are less risky than 
male audit partners’ clienteles (H1), the following OLS regression model is estimated based 
on the pooled sample: 
 
ENGMRISK i = α0 + ß1 FEMALEi +ß2 LnTAi + ß3 LnAGEi + ß4 BIG4i +    ß5 
LnCLIENTi + ß6 FEERATIOi + ß7 PSPEi + ß8 FSPEi +    ß9 
INDUSTRY_DUMMYi + εi 
 
 
(1) 
                                                 
10 In their study, three summary measures of financial distress – the Altman Z-score, the modified Altman Z score, and 
Zmijewski’s probability of bankruptcy score – are used as a primary measure to indicate the riskiness of audit firms’ client 
portfolios (Choi et al. 2004).  
11 As noted by Stice (1991, p. 521), various financial distress prediction models available in the literature “do not statistically 
differ in their ability to predict business failure”. Therefore, in this study, Zmijewski’s probability of bankruptcy score is used 
as a summary measure of financial distress. 
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Table 4.2 summarizes the dependent variables, variable of interest, and control variables used 
in the tests. 
Table 4.2: Definition of Variables  
Dependent Variables 
PBANK Probability of bankruptcy as measured by adjusted Zmijeswki score 
  
Estimated using the coefficients obtained from adjusted Zmijeswki model is as 
follow: 
 -4.803-3.6(NI/TA) + 5.4(TL/TA)-0.1(CA/CL) 
 
Where: 
 NI   = Net income after tax 
 TA   =    Total assets 
 TL   = Total liabilities 
 CA   = Current assets 
 CL   = Current liabilities 
 
ROA Net income divided by total assets 
INVREC Sum of inventory and receivables divided by total assets 
 
Variable of interest 
FEMALE 1 if an audit engagement partner is a female, 0 otherwise. 
  
Control Variables 
LnTA Natural logarithm of client total assets at the end of financial year t. 
LnAGE Natural logarithm of number of years since a company was listed in the ASX. 
BIG4 1 if the company is audited by Big 4 audit firms, 0 otherwise. 
LnCLIENT Natural logarithm of the number of client firms in the audit partner’s portfolio 
in year t.  
FSPE 1 if the audit firm is industry specialist based on amount of aggregated audit 
fees within an industry (two-digit GIC) in year t, 0 otherwise. 
PSPE 1 if the audit partner is industry specialist based on amount of aggregated audit 
fees within an industry (two-digit GIC) in year t, 0 otherwise. 
FEERATIO The ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the auditor. 
GICS10  1 if the company is in the energy industry group, 0 otherwise. 
GICS15 1 if the company is in the materials industry group, 0 otherwise. 
GICS20 1 if the company is in the industrials industry group, 0 otherwise. 
GICS25 1 if the company is in the consumer discretionary industry group, 0 otherwise. 
GICS30 1 if the company is in the consumer staples industry group, 0 otherwise. 
GICS35 1 if the company is in the healthcare industry group, 0 otherwise. 
GICS45 1 if the company is in the information technology industry group, 0 otherwise. 
GICS50 1 if the company is in the telecommunication services industry group, 0 
otherwise. 
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4.3.2 Measurement of Variables 
4.3.2.1 Dependent variables 
Following Choi et al. (2004), a summary measure of financial distress and two financial 
ratios are used as the proxy variables for client firms’ riskiness. 
The summary measure of financial distress (PBANK) is the probability of bankruptcy 
score based on the adjusted Zmijewski (1984) model that includes financial leverage, return 
on assets, and liquidity ratios as dimensions in prediction of bankruptcy12. Accurate prediction 
of business failure is difficult as shown in previous studies on auditors’ going concern 
opinions and default prediction literature (Hay et al. 2014; Hopwood et al. 1989), yet 
bankruptcy models help to identify those companies in financial difficulty. Hence, a large 
proportion of financially distressed firms (proxied by PBANK) in an auditor’s client portfolio 
evidently indicates the auditor’s greater risk tolerance level in client acceptance. As higher 
values represent a higher probability of financial distress, a negative association between 
PBANK and FEMALE is expected.  
The proportion of net income in relation to total assets (ROA) indicates the clients’ 
ability to generate profits and is widely used to capture client business risk (e.g., Choi et al. 
2004; Hardies et al. 2014; Hay et al. 2007; Khalil et al. 2011; Johnstone and Bedard 2004). 
ROA reflects the managements’ efficiency in using their assets to generate profits, and 
accordingly, is closely link to managers’ compensation or evaluation of performance (Kothari 
et al. 2005; Warfield 2005). Low return on assets ratio may create greater pressures on 
managements, which in turn leads to increased audit risk as reflected in potential 
misstatement in financial reporting. As lower values indicate a riskier client firm, a positive 
association between ROA and FEMALE is expected. 
                                                 
12  Auditing research has used the Zmijewski (1984) bankruptcy score as a measure of financial distress of company 
receiving going-concern opinions (for example, Krishnan and Francis, 2002; Carey and Simnett, 2006; Geiger and Rama, 
2006; Carey and Kortum, 2012) or auditors’ litigation risk (for example, Jones and Raghunandan, 1998; Krishnan, 1999; 
Choi et al., 2004). 
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The proportion of inventory and receivables to total assets (INVREC) captures audit 
risk because these accounts require complex measurement and subjective judgement in 
estimating their values, thereby increasing the likelihood of misstatement in financial 
reporting (Fargher and Jiang 2008; Khalil et al. 2011; Krishnan and Krishnan 1996; Shu 
2000; Stice 1991). As higher values indicate a riskier client firm, a negative coefficient for 
FEMALE is expected.  
4.3.2.2 Variable of interest 
The main test variable, FEMALE, is a dummy variable coded as 1 if a signing partner is 
female in year t and 0 otherwise. 
4.3.2.3 Control variables 
Following prior literature (e.g., Hardies et al. 2014; Johnstone and Bedard 2004) 
characteristics of individual audit partners, audit firms and clients are shown to have potential 
confounding effects and are included as control variables.  
With regard to client-related attributes, the natural logarithm of total assets (LnTA) and 
the natural logarithm of number of listed years in the Australian Securities Exchange 
(LnAGE) are included to control for client firms’ size and age, respectively. As younger and 
smaller firms are likely to have more uncertainty and encounter financial distress (Carey and 
Simnett 2006; Francis and Yu 2009), positive coefficients on LnTA and LnAGE are expected.  
The auditor characteristics are controlled at both the firm level and the individual 
partner level. BIG4 is included to control for the size of auditor. Prior research provides 
mixed evidence on the risk tolerance of Big 4 audit firms. Big 4 auditors might be able to 
accept high-risk clients due to more audit resources (Choi et al. 2004; Shu 2000).  However, 
research also shows that public audit firms actively manage their client portfolios to reduce 
litigation risk and maintain their reputation, which should be associated with low-risk 
clienteles (Johnstone and Bedard 2003; Krishnan 2003; Schroeder and Hogan 2013). Given 
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the mixed evidence, whether or not Big 4 audit firms take on riskier clients is unclear. Hence, 
no prediction is made on the direction of the relationship between BIG4 and client riskiness. 
LnCLIENT, measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of audit clients in the audit 
partner’s client portfolios, is included as an audit partner level control (Goodwin and Wu 
2014; Gul et al. 2012a; Sundgren and Svanström 2014; Zerni 2012). It is argued that a large 
client base may decrease the amount of time and audit efforts the audit partner needs to invest 
for each assignment, thereby adversely affect audit quality (Gul et al. 2012b; Sundgren and 
Svanström 2014; Fich and Shivdasani 2007). In recent empirical studies, for example, Gul et 
al. (2012a) and Sundgren and Svanström (2014) found a negative association between audit 
partner busyness (number of clients in the audit partner’s client portfolio) and audit quality as 
measured by the auditors’ propensity to issue a going concern opinion in the U.S setting.  
However, using the Australian data, Goodwin and Wu (2014) found no significant 
relationship between audit partner busyness and the likelihood to issue a going concern 
opinion. Hence, it is uncertain how an increase in the number of clients affects audit partners’ 
judgement and behaviour in assessing engagement risk. Accordingly, there is no specific 
directional expectation between LnCLIENT and clients’ riskiness. 
PSPE and FSPE are used to control for industry specialists at the audit partner and audit firm 
level, respectively. PSPE (FSPE) is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a signing audit 
partner (audit firm) is an industry specialist based on amount of aggregated audit fees within 
an industry (two-digit GICS) in year t; otherwise, it is 0. Extant studies show that client firms 
audited by industry specialists generally have higher audit quality compared to firms audited 
by non-specialist audit firms due to the associated high reputation cost and client-specific 
knowledge (Balsam et al. 2003; Chi and Chin 2011; Knechel et al. 2007; Cenker and Nagy 
2008). For example, Chi and Chin (2011) examine whether audit quality is associated with 
auditor industry expertise and find that both firm level and individual partner level industry 
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specialists are significantly associated with discretionary accruals. In addition, research 
suggests that auditors are more likely to accept high-risk clients when they believe they have 
the industry expertise to help mitigate the risks associated with the clients (Johnstone and 
Bedard 2003; Irving and Walker 2012). Following prior studies (Chi and Chin 2011; Hardies 
et al. 2014; Zerni 2012), the audit partner is defined as an industry specialist (PSPE) if the 
audit partner is top-ranked or second-ranked in the industry based on the audit partner’s 
market share using the amount of aggregated audit fees within an industry in year t. Similarly, 
audit firm industry specialization (FSPE) is based on an audit firm’s annual market shares 
measured by the sum of audit fees within an industry. An auditor firm is defined as an 
industry specialist if the audit firm is the largest or second-largest audit service supplier in the 
industry (Ittonen et al. 2010; Hardies et al. 2014; Zerni 2012).  
Prior research generally shows that a higher proportion of non-audit fees might impair 
auditor independence (Defond et al. 2002). Potential to provide non-audit services may affect 
the auditors’ judgement in assessing the engagement risk by increasing their threshold to 
accept high-risk clients. Accordingly, the ratio of non-audit fees to the total of audit and non-
audit fees (FEERATIO) collected from the individual client firms are controlled for in the 
model (Asare et al. 2005; Carey and Simnett 2006). Finally, an indicator variable for industry 
(two-digit GICS code) is included in the model to control for the possible industry effect 
(two-digit GICS code) on audit partners’ client acceptance decisions due to the different level 
of riskiness and complexity associated with particular industries (Johnstone and Bedard 
2004).  
 
4.3.3 Quantile Regression Model 
A Quantile Regression (QR) method introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) is used 
to test whether auditors’ gender-related difference is prominent in the high-risk engagement 
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context (H2). The QR analysis allows an examination of covariate effects at various cut points 
along the distribution of the dependent variable. For example, quantiles of each engagement 
risk measure (DV) for a specific client firm represents its relative level of engagement risk 
compared to the entire set of firm observations. In other words, the QR estimates the 
conditioning effect of X on Y at various points of distribution. This is particularly relevant to 
the test on H2, because my interest resides precisely in the upper tails of a distribution (high-
risk engagement context) where auditors’ gender differences are expected to be more 
pronounced.  As to the research question, the quantile regression takes the following form:  
 
Quant θ (yi) = α + ßθ FEMALE i + ∑ ßθ Controli + ui        (2) 
 
Where α and ui represent the intercept and error term respectively; Quant θ (yi) is the 
dependent variable at quantile θ. Using the median value of y for the entire sample, where θ = 
0.5, companies with y greater (less) than y in the 50th quantile can be classified as more (less) 
risky clients. In their study examining changes in the riskiness of Big Six audit firms’ client 
portfolios, Choi et al. (2004) use the QR with 10th percentile cutoffs of the client risk 
measures proxy for the riskiest client sup-group. In this study, the 20th percentile cutoff (top 
20 percent of the riskiest client subgroup) is used to define the high-risk engagement context.  
While the exact definition of the riskiest client group is indefinite, this study finds it 
appropriate to use 20th percentile cutoffs due to the lack of variability in the main test 
variable (FEMALE) present across the three different dependent variables at the smallest 
decile (10th percentile). The 50th quantile (median) is used as a reference point, which 
represents the ordinary engagement risk context. The effect of auditors’ gender in the high-
risk context is estimated by fitting the 20th quantile lines in the upper or lower tails of the 
distribution. For example, higher values of PBANK and INVREC (upper tail) indicate higher 
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risk whereas lower values of ROA indicate the relatively higher risk clients (lower tail). 
Accordingly, the 80th quantile for PBANK and INVREC, and 20th quantile for ROA 
represent the high-risk engagement risk. The variable of interest (FEMALE) and a set of 
control variables used in quantile regression are the same as for the OLS model. The standard 
error of the coefficient in the quantile regression model is estimated with the bootstrap 
method, consistent with prior studies using the quantile regression analysis (e.g., Choi et al. 
2004; Li and Hwang 2011; Solakoglu 2013; Lee and Li 2016). 
Given the nature of quantile regression, which divides the data sample into defined deciles or 
percentiles, the bootstrap method enables more robust estimation of the regression effect by 
making changes in bootstrap sample size relative to the actual data sample size (Koenker 
2005). This is a widely used method when conducting quantile regression, as it is useful even 
when the actual sample distribution is not systematic and is valid under many forms of 
heterogeneity (Chi et al. 2015; Lee and Li 2016; Li 2009; Solakoglu 2013).  
 
4.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter outlines the sample selection, data, research method, and variable 
measurements. Based on the firms listed on the ASX from 2013 to 2014, the sample process 
yields a final sample of 2,767 firm-year observations. Models are presented to examine the 
potential effect of auditor gender on client acceptance decisions. Specifically, models test the 
association between auditor gender and the riskiness of auditors’ client portfolios. A summary 
measure of financial distress (PBANK) and two financial ratios, i.e. return on assets (ROA) 
and the proportion of inventory and receivables to total assets (INVREC), are used to capture 
the riskiness of audit partners’ client portfolios. While the variable of interest in this study is 
auditors’ gender, client-related variables and auditors’ characteristics are controlled to capture 
the potential confounding effect. OLS is employed to test whether average female audit 
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partners’ clienteles are less risky than male audit partners’ clienteles (H1), while QR is 
estimated to test whether auditors’ gender-related difference is prominent in the high-risk 
engagement context (H2).  
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Chapter 5: Empirical Results 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the empirical results. Section 5.2 reports descriptive 
statistics and univariate analyses, while multivariate analyses are discussed in Section 
5.3. In particular, Section 5.3.1 provides results from the test of gender difference in 
client acceptance decision (OLS), while Section 5.3.2 provides results from the test of 
observed gender difference (negative association) in the high-risk condition in 
comparison to the ordinary risk condition (QR). Section 5.4 reports the results of 
additional tests. Finally, Section 5.5 summarises the empirical results. 
 
5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables included in the models 
as well as the descriptive statistics for the sub-samples of female and male audit partners. 
The full sample comprises 2,767 firm-year observations for Australian listed companies 
in 2013 and 2014. The p-values for comparison t-tests between means of the two sub-
samples are reported in the last column.  
The average PBANK is -1.546, which suggests that many companies in the 
sample exhibit less bankruptcy risk. However, the average ROA is -0.499, indicating 
that many sample companies were also subject to the economic downturn during the 
sample period and thus experienced some financial difficulty. The average (median) 
ratio of inventory and receivables to total assets is 0.153 (0.062). The number of clients 
(LnCLIENT) of an auditor varies between 1 and 31, with the average (median) number 
of clients approximately 8 (5). Of all firm-year observations, 8.46 percent (N = 234) of 
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the companies were audited by female audit partners, which is consistent with previous 
research using Australian data (Hossain and Chapple 2012)13 and  37.19 percent (N = 
1,029) of the companies were audited by BIG 4 audit firms.  
Table 5.1, Panel B shows that, on average, clients of female auditors are less risky 
than clients of male auditors; companies audited by female auditors are less likely to be 
financially distressed (PBANK: -3.190 versus -1.395, p = 0.000), are more profitable 
(ROA: -0.201 versus -0.526, p = 0.000) with a higher inventory and receivables ratio 
(INVREC: 0.179 versus 0.151, p = 0.038). Clients of female auditors are significantly 
larger in size (LnTA: 17.526 versus 16.994, p = 0.000) with greater number of years 
listed at ASX (LnAGE: 2.484 versus 2.385, p = 0.093) and have a higher percentage of 
non-audit service fees compared with total audit and non-audit service fees charged 
from the client (FEERATIO: 0.184 versus 0.138, p = 0.002).
                                                 
13 Hossain and Chapple (2012) study the impact of audit partners’ gender on audit quality using Australian data over 
the period from 2003 to 2009. They show that female audit engagement increases during their sample period, starting 
from a low of 3.87 percent in 2003 to 6.75 percent in 2009. 
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 Table 5.1: Descriptive Tables  
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample (N = 2,767) 
Continuous Variables Mean  Median  SD  Minimum  Maximum 
PBANK -1.546  -3.100  9.663  -34.245  138.502 
ROA -0.499  -0.121  1.871  -35.168  10.242 
INVREC 0.153  0.062  0.196  0.000  0.999 
LnTA 17.039  16.736  2.221  10.445  24.488 
LnAGE 2.393  2.303  0.743  0.000  4.718 
LnCLIENT 1.647  1.609  1.002  0.000  3.434 
FEERATIO 0.142  0.031  0.193  0.000  0.954 
 
Dichotomous variables Coding 
 
Frequency 
 
Percentage 
FEMALE 1  234  8.46% 
BIG4 1  1,029  37.19% 
FSPE 1  514  18.58% 
PSPE 1  50  1.81% 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics Comparing Female and Male Auditors 
 (1) Female Auditors (n=234)  (2) Male Auditors (n=2,533)    
Continuous 
variables 
Mean Median SD   Mean Median SD   
t-test  
(1) -(2) 
P-value 
PBANK -3.190 -3.081 2.720   -1.395 -3.100 10.052   -1.796*** 0.000 
ROA -0.201 -0.045 0.944   -0.526 -0.126 1.932   0.326*** 0.000 
INVREC 0.179 0.120 0.183   0.151 0.059 0.198   0.028** 0.038 
LnTA 17.526 17.201 2.091   16.994 16.703 2.228   0.533*** 0.000 
LnAGE 2.484 2.398 0.866   2.385 2.303 0.730   0.099* 0.093 
LnCLIENT 0.950 0.693 0.749   1.711 1.609 0.998   -0.761*** 0.000 
FEERATIO 0.184 0.125 0.220   0.138 0.023 0.189   0.047*** 0.002 
 
Dichotomous 
variables 
Percentage of female 
auditors sample 
 
Percentage of male 
auditors sample 
 
 
Diff. 
 
 
P-value 
BIG4 58.97%  35.18%  0.238  0.000 
FSPE 27.78%  17.73%  0.101  0.000 
PSPE 1.28%  1.86%  -0.006  0.529 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Tables 
(continued) 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics Comparing BIG 4 and non-BIG 4 Audit Firms 
 (1) BIG 4 (n=1,029)  (2) non-BIG 4 (n=1,738)    
Continuous 
variables 
Mean Median SD   Mean Median SD   
t-test  
(1) -(2) 
P-value 
PBANK -2.290 -2.912 5.753  -1.106 -3.255 11.339  -1.183 0.000 
ROA -0.231 -0.004 1.137  -0.657 -0.185 2.178  0.426 0.000 
INVREC 0.193 0.121 0.193  0.129 0.034 0.195  0.064 0.000 
LnTA 18.531 18.481 2.271  16.15 16.147 1.644  2.376 0.000 
LnAGE 2.569 2.565 0.777  2.289 2.197 0.702  0.280 0.000 
LnCLIENT 1.150 1.099 0.748  1.941 2.079 1.018  -0.791 0.000 
FEERATIO 0.218 0.157 0.220  0.097 0.000 0.158  0.121 0.000 
 
 
Dichotomous 
Variables 
Percentage of  
BIG 4 sample 
 
Percentage  
non-BIG 4 sample 
 
 
Diff. 
 
 
P-value 
FEMALE 13.41%  5.52%  0.079  0.000 
FSPE 49.98%  0.58%  0.494  0.000 
PSPE 4.18%  0.40%  0.038  0.000 
 
In terms of audit partner characteristics, female auditors are, on average, more 
likely to work for BIG 4 audit firms (BIG4: 58.97 percent versus 35.18 percent, p = 
0.000), industry specialist audit firms (FSPE: 27.78 percent versus 17.73 percent, p = 
0.000), and have a significantly smaller client base (LnCLIENT: 0.950 versus 1.711, p 
= 0.000) compared to male auditors. The percentage of female audit partners who are 
industry specialists (PSPE) is not statistically different from male audit partners (p = 
0.529).  
Panel C reports additional descriptive statistics for the sub-samples of BIG 4 and 
non-BIG 4 audit firms. Panel C indicates that the clientele of BIG 4 audit firms 
significantly differs from that of non-BIG 4 audit firms. Overall, clients of BIG 4 audit 
firms are significantly less likely to experience financial distress (PBANK), more 
profitable (ROA), and have a greater percentage of assets represented by inventory and 
receivables (INVREC) compared to clients of non-BIG 4 audit firms. The percentage of 
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female auditors in BIG 4 audit firms is more than double compared to the proportion of 
female auditors in non-BIG 4 audit firms (13.41 percent versus 5.52 percent).   
Table 5.2 reports the Pearson correlation matrix among variables used in the 
models. The test variable FEMALE is negatively (positively) associated with PBANK 
(ROA), suggesting that clients with female audit partners are less likely to be risky. The 
correlation of FEMALE is positive with INVREC, indicating that clients of female 
auditors have a higher level of inventories and receivables. All control variables are also 
significantly correlated with the dependent variables, except for LnAGE and PSPE. 
LnAGE and PSPE are not significantly associated with dependent variables, ROA and 
PBANK, respectively. The strongest correlations between independent variables are 
found between BIG4 and LnTA (0.517) and between FSPE and BIG4 (0.602). These 
correlations indicate that BIG 4 audit firms are more likely to be industry leaders in 
terms of aggregated audit fees and their client size tends to be larger, consistent with 
prior studies (Cenker and Nagy 2008). As shown in the last column of collinearity 
diagnostics, variance inflation factors (VIF) are not greater than 2.97, suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not an issue for the subsequent analyses (Tabachnick and Fidell 
2001).  
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Table 5.2: Pearson Correlation Matrix of Test Variables 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) VIF 
(1)PBANK 1.000 
           
(2)ROA -0.796*** 1.000 
          
(3)INVREC 0.067*** 0.077*** 1.000 
         
(4)FEMALE -0.052*** 0.048** 0.039** 1.000 
       
1.06 
(5)LnTA -0.277*** 0.348*** 0.193*** 0.067*** 1.000 
      
1.65 
(6)LnAGE 0.063*** 0.009 0.165*** 0.037* 0.202** 1.000 
     
1.10 
(7)BIG4 -0.059*** 0.110*** 0.157*** 0.137*** 0.517** 0.182*** 1.000 
    
1.99 
(8)LnCLIENT 0.048** -0.121*** -0.227*** -0.211*** -0.345** -0.145*** -0.381*** 1.000 
   
1.40 
(9)FSPE -0.048** 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.072*** 0.368** 0.131*** 0.602*** -0.288*** 1.000 
  
1.63 
(10)PSPE -0.009 0.034* 0.064*** -0.012 0.202** 0.058*** 0.137*** -0.080*** 0.207*** 1.000 
 
1.09 
(11)FEERATIO -0.071*** 0.113*** 0.104*** 0.067*** 0.345** -0.064*** 0.304*** -0.206*** 0.191*** 0.063*** 1.000 1.22 
Statistical significance based on a two – tailed test at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively 
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5.3 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
5.3.1 Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) Results 
Panel A of Table 5.3 provides the multivariate results examining whether clients 
of female audit partners are less risky than clients of male audit partners (H1). Columns 
(1) - (3) report pooled OLS regression estimates, with PBANK, ROA and INVREC 
used as the dependent variable, respectively. Following prior research, robust standard 
errors are computed by using the Huber/White sandwich estimator to address the 
“mutual dependence of observations from the same individual auditor” (Hardies et al. 
2015).  
The coefficients of FEMALE are in the expected direction when Model 1 is 
estimated on all three individual dependent variables. In Column (1) where PBANK is 
used as the dependent variable, the coefficient of FEMALE is negative and significant 
(p = 0.000), indicating that companies with female auditors are on average less risky 
than companies with male auditors. In Column (2), using ROA as the dependent 
variable, the coefficient of FEMALE is positive and significant (p = 0.012). The 
magnitude of the coefficient on FEMALE suggests that companies audited by female 
audit partners showed significantly higher profitability compared to companies audited 
by male audit partners (p = 0.012). In the third Column when using INVREC as a 
dependent variable, the coefficient of FEMALE is negative but not significant (p = 
0.600).   
With respect to client characteristics, results show that larger and younger firms 
are less likely to be financially distressed (-1.739, p = 0.000) and show better 
performance in terms of profitability (0.349, p = 0.000). Companies audited by BIG 4 
auditors are more likely to be financially distressed (1.950, p = 0.000) and less 
profitable in their business (-0.370, p = 0.000) compared to the companies audited by 
 Chapter 5: Empirical Results 61 
non-BIG 4 auditors. This is consistent with the argument that BIG 4 audit firms have 
more resources and technology that enable them to serve relatively riskier clients (Shu 
2000; Krishnan 2003; Schroeder and Hogan 2013). 
Likewise, companies with industry specialized audit partners are more likely to be 
financially distressed and less profitable (2.750, p = 0.000 and -0.448, p = 0.001, 
respectively), indicating that assigning an audit partner with industry expertise is a 
typical risk management strategy for high-risk engagement, and therefore clients of 
industry specialised auditors are more likely to be risky which confers with prior 
research (Johnstone and Bedard 2004; Cenker and Nagy 2008; Asare et al. 2005). There 
is, however, weak evidence at audit firm level that companies audited by industry 
specialised audit firms differ from companies with non-industry specialised audit firms; 
significant relation is only found when INVREC is used as a dependent variable (FSPE; 
-0.033, p = 0.008). In addition, the coefficient on FEERATIO is not significant across 
all the columns, suggesting that the potential to provide the non-audit service may not 
be the main consideration when auditors make the client acceptance decision, consistent 
with prior research (Asare et al. 2005). 
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Table 5.3:  Regression Results for the Client Firm Characteristics 
 
Panel A: OLS      
 (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
Variable Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
(p-value) 
FEMALE -1.609***  0.195**  -0.007 
 (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.600) 
LnTA -1.739***  0.349***  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.864) 
LnAGE 1.521***  -0.163***  0.025*** 
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.000) 
BIG4 1.950***  -0.370***  0.020 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.118) 
LnCLIENT -0.082  -0.017  -0.008* 
 (0.708)  (0.649)  (0.092) 
FSPE -0.131  -0.005  -0.033*** 
 (0.719)  (0.939)  (0.008) 
PSPE 2.750***  -0.448***  0.045 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.206) 
FEERATIO 1.372  -0.142  -0.006 
 (0.116)  (0.189)  (0.738) 
Constant 27.906***  -6.351***  0.063 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.199) 
Industry Included  Included  Included 
Year Included  Included  Included 
      
N 2,767  2,767  2,767 
R-squared 0.116  0.138  0.272 
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Table 5.3: Regression Results for the Client Firm Characteristics 
(continued) 
Panel B: QR 
 (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
Variable q50 q80  q50 q20  q50 q80 
FEMALE -0.358** -0.658***  0.058*** 0.147***  -0.002 -0.040** 
 (0.015) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.825) (0.032) 
LnTA -0.283*** -0.818***  0.094*** 0.191***  0.001 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.133) (0.572) 
LnAGE 0.225*** 0.373***  -0.012* -0.047**  0.011*** 0.036*** 
 (0.000) (0.008)  (0.074) (0.024)  (0.000) (0.000) 
BIG4 0.602*** 1.448***  -0.112*** -0.298***  0.012* 0.050** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.078) (0.009) 
LnCLIENT -0.115** 0.071  -0.003 -0.010  -0.004*** -0.019** 
 (0.048) (0.523)  (0.702) (0.611)  (0.012) (0.009) 
FSPE -0.111 0.153  0.014 -0.021  -0.005 -0.040* 
 (0.472) (0.566)  (0.410) (0.674)  (0.526) (0.068) 
PSPE 1.024*** 1.355***  -0.129*** -0.262***  0.053** -0.007 
 (0.000) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.014) (0.794) 
FEERATIO 0.273 0.568  -0.034 0.007  0.002 -0.002 
 (0.217) (0.308)  (0.235) (0.912)  (0.745) (0.934) 
Constant 2.826*** 13.988***  -1.707*** -3.692***  0.000 0.214*** 
 (0.002) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.986) (0.010) 
Industry Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Year Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
      
N 2,767 2,767  2,767 2,767  2,767 2,767 
Panel A details pooled OLS regression results of Models (1), with PBANK, ROA and INVREC at the top of the 
column used as the dependent variable, respectively. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Panel B reports Quantile 
Regression results of Model (2), with PBANK, ROA and INVREC at the top of the column used as the dependent 
variable, respectively.   The 50th quantile (median) is used as a reference point, which represents the ordinary 
engagement risk context. The effect of auditors’ gender in the high-risk context is estimated by fitting the 20th 
quantile lines in the upper or lower tails of the distribution. Accordingly, the 80th quantile for PBANK and INVREC, 
and 20th quantile for ROA represent the high-risk engagement risk. PBANK is probability of bankruptcy as measured 
by adjusted Zmijeswki score; ROA is net income divided by total assets; INVREC is sum of inventory and 
receivables divided by total assets; FEMALE is a dummy coded 1 if a signing engagement partner is female and 0 
otherwise. LnTA is the natural logarithm of client total assets; LnAGE is the natural logarithm of number of years 
since a company was listed in the ASX; BIG4 is a dummy coded 1 if the company is audited by BIG 4 audit firms 
and 0 otherwise; LnCLIENT is the natural logarithm of the number of client firms in the audit partner’s portfolio; 
FSPE is a dummy coded 1 if the audit firm is industry specialist based on amount of aggregated audit fees within an 
industry (two-digit GIC) and 0 otherwise; PSPE is a dummy coded 1 if the audit partner is industry specialist based 
on amount of aggregated audit fees within an industry (two-digit GIC) and 0 otherwise; FEERATIO is non-audit fees 
divided by the total of audit and non-audit fees paid to the auditor. All reported p-values are two-tailed. Statistical 
significance based on a two – tailed test at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels are denoted by ***, **, 
and *, respectively.   
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5.3.2 Quantile Regression Results 
Panel B in Table 5.3 reports the estimation results of the quantile regressions with 
PBANK, ROA, and INVREC used as the dependent variable, respectively. In the first 
column where PBANK is used as the dependent variable, a significant negative 
association between Female and PBANK is found at both median (p = 0.015) and high-
risk level (p = 0.008), indicating clients of female auditors exhibit less financial distress. 
However, the magnitude of gender difference becomes larger at the 80th quantile when 
compared to the 50th quantile (-0.358 versus -0.658). In support of H2, the effect of 
auditors’ gender difference becomes more prominent among the high-risk client group.  
Similarly, positive association between Female and ROA are found at both 
median and high-risk level (p = 0.005). The greater gender difference (coefficient) is 
also found at the high-risk quantile compared to the median quantile (0.147 versus 
0.058). This result suggests that the effect of auditors’ gender difference becomes more 
pronounced among the high-risk client group compared to clients in the ordinary 
(median) risk context, thereby supporting H2. 
In Column 3 when INVREC is used as the dependent variable, the results show a 
negative association between FEMALE and INVREC, but this effect is only significant 
at the high-risk quantile (-0.002, p = 0.825 versus -0.040, p = 0.032, respectively). Both 
coefficient magnitude and statistical significance further support H2, with the effect of 
auditors’ gender difference becoming more prominent among the high-risk client group.  
In terms of client characteristics, LnTA is negatively associated with PBANK (p = 
0.000) and positively associated with ROA (p = 0.000), and these effects are stronger at 
the high-risk quantiles compared to those at the median quantiles (PBANK: -0.818 
versus -0.283 and ROA: 0.191 versus 0.094, respectively). On the other hand, LnAGE 
is positively associated with PBANK and negatively associated with ROA both at the 
 Chapter 5: Empirical Results 65 
median and high-risk quantiles, and these relations are more prominent within the high-
risk engagement context compared to the ordinary (median) engagement risk context 
(PBANK: 0.373 versus 0.225 and ROA: -0.047 versus -0.012, respectively).  
With respect to auditor characteristics, BIG4 is positively associated with PBANK 
(0.602 versus 1.448) and INVREC (0.012 versus 0.050) and negatively associated with 
ROA (-0.112 versus -0.298) at both median and high-risk quantiles, with stronger 
effects at the high-risk quantiles compared to median quantiles.  
LnCLIENT has significant association with INVREC, both at median (-0.004, p = 
0.012) and high-risk quantiles (-0.019, p = 0.009). LnCLIENT is negatively related to 
PBANK at the median quantile (-0.115 p= 0.048), while a non-significant effect is 
observed at the high-risk quantile. In relation to ROA, no significant effect is found 
both at median and high-risk quantiles. 
FSPE is significantly associated with INVREC only for the high-risk quantile (-
0.040, p = 0.068), while no significant relationship is found with PBANK and ROA 
across two different risk quantiles. PSPE is found to have a positive association with 
PBANK and INVREC (except for the high-risk quantile with p = 0.794), while being 
negatively related with ROA across two different risk quantiles. FEERATIO is not 
related with any of the dependent variables across two different levels of risk quantiles. 
 
5.4 ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
To test the robustness of the above results in Table 5.3, a number of additional 
tests are conducted. First, the results are examined to be robust for the balanced panel 
data. With balanced panel data, those companies that appear only either in 2013 or 2014 
are excluded from the sample (N = 209) to reduce the individual heterogeneity across 
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the different firms. The results of OLS regression and quantile regression analyses for 
balanced panel data are reported in Panel A and Panel B of Table 5.4.  
 
Table 5.4: Balanced Panel Data 
 
Panel A: OLS      
 (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
Variable Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
(p-value) 
FEMALE -1.519***  0.155*  -0.006 
 (0.000)  (0.055)  (0.620) 
LnTA -1.435***  0.321***  -0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.802) 
LnAGE 1.411***  -0.145**  0.025*** 
 (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.000) 
BIG4 1.237***  -0.294***  0.018 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.137) 
LnCLIENT -0.089  -0.013  -0.009** 
 (0.657)  (0.687)  (0.048) 
FSPE 0.250  -0.062  -0.033** 
 (0.479)  (0.357)  (0.013) 
PSPE 2.172***  -0.340***  0.057 
 (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.106) 
FEERATIO 1.013  -0.117  0.003 
 (0.244)  (0.272)  (0.857) 
Constant 23.063***  -6.181***  0.072 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.173) 
Industry Included  Included  Included 
Year Included  Included  Included 
      
N 2,558  2,558  2,558 
R-squared 0.105  0.149  0.287 
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Table 5.4: Balanced Panel Data 
(continued) 
 
Panel B: QR 
 (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
Variable q50 q80  q50 q20  q50 q80 
FEMALE -0.456*** -0.697**  0.044** 0.157***  -0.001 -0.041** 
 (0.002) (0.023)  (0.017) (0.001)  (0.891) (0.030) 
LnTA -0.232*** -0.787***  0.089*** 0.187***  0.002 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.109) (0.676) 
LnAGE 0.243*** 0.462***  -0.009 -0.055**  0.011*** 0.034*** 
 (0.000) (0.006)  (0.202) (0.015)  (0.000) (0.000) 
BIG4 0.457*** 1.359***  -0.099*** -0.287***  0.012 0.049** 
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.141) (0.029) 
LnCLIENT -0.120** 0.073  -0.007 -0.014  -0.003** -0.017** 
 (0.025) (0.538)  (0.297) (0.394)  (0.033) (0.023) 
FSPE -0.017 0.123  -0.001 -0.028  -0.004 -0.038* 
 (0.907) (0.635)  (0.949) (0.520)  (0.624) (0.075) 
PSPE 1.068*** 1.262***  -0.114*** -0.267***  0.046* -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.065) (0.990) 
FEERATIO 0.171 0.211  -0.032 -0.001  0.006 0.012 
 (0.477) (0.714)  (0.264) (0.984)  (0.459) (0.752) 
Constant 1.554 13.570***  -1.621*** -3.622***  -0.004 0.184** 
 (0.120) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.834) (0.024) 
Industry Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Year Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
      
Observations 2,558 2,558  2,558 2,558  2,558 2,558 
Panel A details pooled OLS regression results of Models (1), with PBANK, ROA and INVREC at the top of the 
column used as the dependent variable, respectively. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Panel B reports Quantile 
Regression results of Model (2), with PBANK, ROA and INVREC at the top of the column used as the dependent 
variable, respectively. The effect of auditors’ gender in the high-risk context is estimated by fitting the 20th quantile 
lines in the upper or lower tails of the distribution. Accordingly, the 80th quantile for PBANK and INVREC, and 
20th quantile for ROA represent the high-risk engagement risk.  PBANK is probability of bankruptcy as measured by 
adjusted Zmijeswki score; ROA is net income divided by total assets; INVREC is sum of inventory and receivables 
divided by total assets; FEMALE is a dummy coded 1 if a signing engagement partner is female and 0 otherwise. 
LnTA is the natural logarithm of client total assets; LnAGE is the natural logarithm of number of years since a 
company was listed in the ASX; BIG4 is a dummy coded 1 if the company is audited by BIG 4 audit firms and 0 
otherwise; LnCLIENT is the natural logarithm of the number of client firms in the audit partner’s portfolio; FSPE is a 
dummy coded 1 if the audit firm is industry specialist based on amount of aggregated audit fees within an industry 
(two-digit GIC) and 0 otherwise; PSPE is a dummy coded 1 if the audit partner is industry specialist based on amount 
of aggregated audit fees within an industry (two-digit GIC) and 0 otherwise; FEERATIO is non-audit fees divided by 
the total of audit and non-audit fees paid to the auditor. All reported p-values are two-tailed. Statistical significance 
based on a two – tailed test at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, 
respectively.   
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Overall, previously reported findings from the pooled sample remain essentially 
unchanged. Panel A shows that the previously reported findings in Table 5.3 remain 
essentially unchanged, with the coefficient of FEMALE being negative and significant 
(-1.519, p = 0.000) when PBANK is used as the dependent variable, and the coefficient 
of FEMALE is positive and marginally significant (0.155, p = 0.055) when using ROA 
as the dependent variable. Collectively, the results support H1: that female audit 
partners’ client portfolios are, on average, less risky than male audit partners. Consistent 
with the above quantile regression analysis, results in Panel B show that the effect of 
auditors’ gender difference becomes more pronounced among the high-risk client 
group, suggesting that female audit partners’ less risky client portfolios depends on a 
specific high-risk engagement context (H2).  
Second, consistent results are observed when the subsample of 2013 and 2014 
financial years are separately used. Findings of yearly regression analysis primarily 
confirm those results in Table 5.3 with minor exception. For instance, Panel A in Table 
5.5 shows that the coefficient for ROA is positive but insignificant in the 2014 
subsample (p = 0.325). Other results are comparable to those documented in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.5: Yearly Results 
 
Panel A: OLS 
 2013  2014 
 (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC  (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
Variable Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
 (p-value) 
 Estimate 
 (p-value)  
Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
 (p-value) 
 Estimate 
 (p-value) 
FEMALE -1.637***  0.272***  -0.005  -1.680***  0.125  -0.007 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.736)  (0.001)  (0.325)  (0.624) 
LnTA -1.689***  0.348***  -0.000  -1.781***  0.351***  0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.932)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.679) 
LnAGE 1.938***  -0.258**  0.023***  1.199***  -0.088*  0.025*** 
 (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.084)  (0.000) 
BIG4 1.767***  -0.373***  0.017  2.040***  -0.362***  0.022 
 (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.247)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.117) 
LnCLIENT -0.108  -0.047  -0.007  -0.050  0.016  -0.009 
 (0.695)  (0.337)  (0.209)  (0.854)  (0.755)  (0.115) 
FSPE -0.232  0.056  -0.033**  0.032  -0.073  -0.035** 
 (0.671)  (0.583)  (0.028)  (0.950)  (0.419)  (0.027) 
PSPE 1.988**  -0.324*  0.108**  3.273***  -0.530***  -0.019 
 (0.031)  (0.052)  (0.018)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.566) 
FEERATIO -0.340  -0.063  0.024  3.173**  -0.217  -0.038 
 (0.685)  (0.633)  (0.289)  (0.030)  (0.170)  (0.107) 
Constant 25.264***  -6.100***  0.073  29.801***  -6.565***  0.056 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.199)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.308) 
Industry Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Year Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
            
N 1,390  1,390  1,390  1,377  1,377  1,377 
R-squared 0.112  0.131  0.284  0.125  0.151  0.266 
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Table 5.5: Yearly Results (continued) 
Panel B: QR 
 
2013 
 
2014 
  (1)PBANK 
 
(2)ROA 
 
(3)INVREC 
 
(1)PBANK 
 
(2)ROA 
 
(3)INVREC 
Variable q50 q80 
 
q50 q20 
 
q50 q80 
 
q50 q80 
 
q50 q20 
 
q50 q80 
FEMALE -0.436** -0.885** 
 
0.079*** 0.202*** 
 
0.003 -0.040** 
 
-0.252 -0.587** 
 
0.037 0.155** 
 
-0.006 -0.032 
 
(0.032) (0.023) 
 
(0.006) (0.003) 
 
(0.821) (0.043) 
 
(0.325) (0.044) 
 
(0.168) (0.029) 
 
(0.580) (0.360) 
LnTA -0.235*** -0.771*** 
 
0.098*** 0.198*** 
 
0.002 0.000 
 
-0.318*** -0.853*** 
 
0.090*** 0.190*** 
 
0.001 -0.005 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.234) (0.950) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.363) (0.318) 
LnAGE 0.315*** 0.756*** 
 
-0.030** -0.071** 
 
0.011*** 0.032** 
 
0.187** 0.327** 
 
-0.003 -0.047* 
 
0.012*** 0.036*** 
 
(0.005) (0.007) 
 
(0.029) (0.038) 
 
(0.003) (0.017) 
 
(0.026) (0.043) 
 
(0.714) (0.090) 
 
(0.001) (0.004) 
BIG4 0.371* 1.253*** 
 
-0.101*** -0.374*** 
 
0.009 0.033 
 
0.720*** 1.436*** 
 
-0.103*** -0.250*** 
 
0.023** 0.068** 
 
(0.064) (0.009) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.374) (0.262) 
 
(0.001) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.022) (0.011) 
LnCLIENT -0.095 0.022 
 
0.003 -0.038 
 
-0.003 -0.020* 
 
-0.165* 0.109 
 
-0.007 0.009 
 
-0.005** -0.016 
 
(0.228) (0.903) 
 
(0.818) (0.146) 
 
(0.148) (0.071) 
 
(0.090) (0.541) 
 
(0.365) (0.738) 
 
(0.016) (0.118) 
FSPE 0.076 -0.074 
 
0.002 0.012 
 
-0.003 -0.033 
 
-0.308 0.373 
 
0.014 -0.038 
 
-0.019* -0.041 
 
(0.707) (0.835) 
 
(0.938) (0.873) 
 
(0.787) (0.249) 
 
(0.141) (0.343) 
 
(0.525) (0.566) 
 
(0.097) (0.139) 
PSPE 0.610 1.291* 
 
-0.033 -0.185 
 
0.084** 0.022 
 
1.301*** 1.342** 
 
-0.186*** -0.317** 
 
-0.015 -0.017 
 
(0.182) (0.081) 
 
(0.588) (0.136) 
 
(0.021) (0.863) 
 
(0.000) (0.020) 
 
(0.001) (0.010) 
 
(0.696) (0.685) 
FEERATIO 0.206 -0.418 
 
0.015 0.111 
 
0.006 -0.001 
 
0.399 1.494** 
 
-0.058 -0.119 
 
-0.001 -0.015 
 
(0.514) (0.539) 
 
(0.756) (0.309) 
 
(0.647) (0.989) 
 
(0.264) (0.046) 
 
(0.150) (0.264) 
 
(0.918) (0.752) 
Constant 1.520 12.542*** 
 
-1.743*** -3.782*** 
 
-0.011 0.194** 
 
3.566*** 14.649*** 
 
-1.597*** -3.698*** 
 
0.024 0.244** 
 
(0.229) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.783) (0.049) 
 
(0.001) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.485) (0.024) 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
                  
Observations 1,390 1,390   1,390 1,390   1,390 1,390 
 
1,377 1,377   1,377 1,377   1,377 1,377 
Statistical significance based on a two – tailed test at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
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Third, Table 5.6 exhibits the results for additional regressions for the subsamples 
of BIG 4 and non-BIG 4 auditors. Overall, the association between female auditors and 
the riskiness of clienteles are more pronounced in the non-BIG 4 subsample. 
Panel B in Table 5.6 shows that when the subsample of non-BIG 4 auditors is 
used, the results of the OLS regression analysis are consistent with the findings reported 
in Table 5.3. However, when the subsample of BIG 4 auditors is analysed, the 
coefficient of FEMALE is negative but insignificant (-0.430, p = 0.0169) when PBANK 
is used as the dependent variable. The results of the quantile regression analysis in Panel 
C show a similar pattern to the estimates of OLS regression. The riskiness of female 
auditors’ client portfolios is more pronounced in the high-risk engagement context, but 
only among the subsample of non-BIG 4 auditors. When the subsample of BIG 4 
auditors is used, there is no significant result between female auditors and riskiness of 
clients across all Columns.  
 
 72  Chapter 5: Empirical Results 
Table 5.6: BIG 4 versus non- BIG 4 Auditors 
 
 (1) BIG 4 (N = 1,029)  (2) non-BIG 4 (N = 1,738)     
Variable Mean  Std. Dev.  Median  Mean  Std. Dev.  Median  
t-test     
 (1) - (2) 
 P -value 
FEMALE 0.134  0.341  0.000  0.055  0.229  0.000  0.079***  0.000 
PBANK -2.290  5.753  -2.912  -1.106  11.339  -3.255  -1.183***  0.000 
ROA -0.231  1.137  -0.004  -0.657  2.178  -0.185  0.426***  0.000 
INVREC 0.193  0.193  0.121  0.129  0.195  0.034  0.064***  0.000 
LnTA 18.531  2.271  18.481  16.155  1.644  16.147  2.376***  0.000 
LnAGE 2.569  0.777  2.565  2.289  0.702  2.197  0.280***  0.000 
LnCLIENT 1.150  0.748  1.099  1.941  1.018  2.079  -0.791***  0.000 
FSPE 0.490  0.500  0.000  0.006  0.076  0.000  0.484***  0.000 
PSPE 0.042  0.200  0.000  0.004  0.063  0.000  0.038***  0.000 
FEERATIO 0.218  0.220  0.157  0.097  0.158  0.000  0.121***  0.000 
 Chapter 5: Empirical Results  
73 
Table 5.6: BIG 4 versus non-BIG 4 Auditors (continued) 
Panel B: OLS  
 (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
Variable BIG4  Non BIG4  t-test      BIG4  Non BIG4  t-test  BIG4  Non BIG4  t-test     
FEMALE -0.430  -2.700***  7.60  0.110**  0.275**  1.52  0.013  -0.026  2.56 
 (0.169)  (0.006)  (0.110)  (0.043)  (0.026)  (0.217)  (0.422)  (0.161)  (0.110) 
LnTA -0.491***  -2.883***  39.60  0.167***  0.522***  22.69***  0.001  0.001  0.02 
 (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.110)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.838)  (0.629)  (0.892) 
LnAGE 0.441**  2.185***  11.42***  -0.050*  -0.231**  3.26*  0.037***  0.014*  3.64* 
 (0.049)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.070)  (0.018)  (0.071)  (0.000)  (0.099)  (0.057) 
LnCLIENT 0.562***  -0.334  6.01**  -0.087*  0.016  2.35  0.006  -0.012**  3.29* 
 (0.004)  (0.284)  (0.014)  (0.059)  (0.750)  (0.125)  (0.455)  (0.031)  (0.070) 
FSPE -0.442  6.205**  5.35**  0.030  -0.185  1.01  -0.031***  -0.007  0.08 
 (0.141)  (0.032)  (0.021)  (0.635)  (0.370)  (0.316)  (0.010)  (0.927)  (0.776) 
PSPE 0.958**  1.584  0.18  -0.151*  -0.376*  1.11  0.012  0.258***  26.66*** 
 (0.022)  (0.271)  (0.674)  (0.087)  (0.056)  (0.293)  (0.634)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
FEERATIO 1.361  -0.185  0.87  -0.028  -0.034  0.00  0.008  -0.013  0.35 
 (0.280)  (0.867)  (0.352)  (0.830)  (0.837)  (0.977)  (0.733)  (0.626)  (0.553) 
Constant 6.736**  45.265***    -3.267***  -9.056***    -0.020  0.141**   
 (0.025)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.801)  (0.025)   
Industry Included  Included    Included  Included    Included  Included   
Year Included  Included    Included  Included    Included  Included   
                  
Observations 1,029  1,738    1,029  1,738    1,029  1,738   
R-squared 0.045  0.185    0.139  0.162    0.285  0.259   
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Table 5.6: BIG 4 versus non-BIG 4 Auditors (continued) 
Panel C: QR 
 (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
 BIG4  Non BIG4  BIG4  Non BIG4  BIG4  Non BIG4 
Variable q50 q80  q50 q80  q50 q20  q50 q20  q50 q80  q50 q80 
FEMALE 0.217 -0.038  -0.971*** -1.747***  0.014 0.067  0.116*** 0.264***  0.006 -0.034  -0.009** -0.036 
 (0.104) (0.861)  (0.000) (0.002)  (0.449) (0.123)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.689) (0.230)  (0.036) (0.249) 
LnTA 0.022 -0.286***  -0.662*** -1.528***  0.051*** 0.117***  0.143*** 0.289***  0.006** 0.007  -0.000 -0.003 
 (0.579) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.012) (0.315)  (0.632) (0.426) 
LnAGE 0.079 0.098  0.381*** 1.023***  0.001 -0.009  -0.016 -0.066*  0.036*** 0.036**  0.005*** 0.017* 
 (0.280) (0.375)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.899) (0.641)  (0.252) (0.082)  (0.000) (0.021)  (0.006) (0.076) 
LnCLIENT -0.176* 0.062  -0.117 -0.074  0.003 -0.006  -0.010 -0.022  0.003 -0.014  -0.004*** -0.010 
 (0.051) (0.749)  (0.138) (0.684)  (0.798) (0.789)  (0.300) (0.404)  (0.661) (0.318)  (0.001) (0.191) 
FSPE -0.123 -0.019  0.787 1.997  0.005 0.016  -0.034 -0.141  -0.011 -0.057**  -0.056 0.087 
 (0.302) (0.931)  (0.721) (0.833)  (0.746) (0.592)  (0.830) (0.517)  (0.244) (0.016)  (0.724) (0.593) 
PSPE 0.223 0.867**  2.231** -0.040  -0.055 -0.153***  -0.064 -0.078  0.013 -0.039  0.321 0.448** 
 (0.403) (0.041)  (0.011) (0.982)  (0.137) (0.008)  (0.738) (0.765)  (0.477) (0.169)  (0.125) (0.016) 
FEERATIO -0.018 -0.154  0.401 0.629  0.027 0.114*  -0.005 -0.045  0.003 -0.030  -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.947) (0.696)  (0.195) (0.591)  (0.326) (0.063)  (0.932) (0.767)  (0.877) (0.525)  (0.614) (0.880) 
Constant -2.081** 5.029***  7.926*** 23.899***  -1.011*** -2.601***  -2.458*** -5.094***  -0.149*** -0.016  0.089 0.407*** 
 (0.019) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.909)  (0.111) (0.000) 
Industry Included Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Year Included Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Observations 1,029 1,029  1,738 1,738  1,029 1,029  1,738 1,738  1,029 1,029  1,738 1,738 
Statistical significance based on a two – tailed test at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
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Finally, Panel A in Table 5.7 reports the estimation results of OLS regression with 
an interaction (FEMALE x PSPE) as the additional explanatory variable. PSPE is a 
dummy variable taking a value of 1 based on the amount of aggregated audit fees within 
an industry (two-digit GIC) in year t, and 0 otherwise. The main results in Table 5.7 
suggest that audit partner level industry expertise may be an important factor affecting 
female auditors’ behaviours within the client acceptance decision context. The results of 
Panel A show a significant interaction effect (FEMALE x PSPE) on PBANK (6.108, p 
= 0.000) and ROA (-1.047, p = 0.000). These results suggest that the clients of 
specialised female audit partners are, on average, riskier than the clients of non-
specialised female audit partners, suggesting that female auditors with industry 
expertise are more likely to act similarly to their male counterparts. 
The results of quantile regression are presented in Panel B of Table 5.7 at both 
median and high-risk quantiles, significant interaction effects (Female x PSPE) are 
found on PBANK (1.915, p = 0.070 versus 2.099, p = 0.092) and ROA (-0.259, p = 
0.000 versus -0.320, p = 0.011). These interaction effects are stronger at high-risk 
quantiles than median quantiles. In other words, although in general female audit 
partners tend to have less risky clients compared to their male peers, female audit 
partners with industry expertise tend to be riskier compared to the clients with non-
industry specialised female auditors, and this effect is more prominent within the high-
risk engagement context. One possible explanation for why female specialized auditors 
are riskier than their male counterparts is offered by social identity theory. From this 
perspective, when individuals experience stereotypes that are negatively related to their 
performance, they are likely to focus on monitoring themselves and ‘become vigilant to 
detect the sign of failure or errors’, resulting in more cautious and conservative 
behaviour in decision-making. Therefore, it is plausible that the very implicit 
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stereotypes may make female auditors concerned about being judged on the basis of 
their gender rather than their professional identity being more conservative in evaluating 
engagement risk and hence may only accept risky clients when they are highly 
confident that they have the appropriate skills and competencies to serve those clients. 
In other words, comprehensive knowledge associated with certain clients’ particular 
industries could drive specialized female auditors to act more like their male 
counterparts, leading to no gender differences in this regard. 
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Table 5.7: Industry Specialist- Auditor Industry Specialist 
 
Panel A: Estimated Coefficients for OLS  
 (1) PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
Variable Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
(p-value) 
FEMALE -1.694***  0.209***  -0.006 
 (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.650) 
LnTA -1.746***  0.350***  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.847) 
LnAGE 1.509***  -0.161***  0.025*** 
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.000) 
BIG4 1.956***  -0.371***  0.019 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.119) 
LnCLIENT -0.087  -0.016  -0.008* 
 (0.692)  (0.665)  (0.094) 
FSPE -0.119  -0.007  -0.034*** 
 (0.745)  (0.913)  (0.008) 
PSPE 2.382***  -0.385***  0.048 
 (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.196) 
FEERATIO 1.396  -0.146  -0.006 
 (0.109)  (0.176)  (0.729) 
FEMALExPSPE 6.108***  -1.047***  -0.053 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.251) 
Constant 28.088***  -6.382***  0.062 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.215) 
Industry Included  Included  Included 
Year Included  Included  Included 
      
N 2,767  2,767  2,767 
R-squared 0.116  0.139  0.272 
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Table 5.7: Industry Specialist- Auditor Industry specialist 
(continued) 
Panel B: Estimated Coefficients for Quantile Regressions  
 (1)PBANK  (2)ROA  (3)INVREC 
Variable q50 q80  q50 q20  q50 q80 
FEMALE -0.429** -0.762**  0.063*** 0.158***  -0.001 -0.038* 
 (0.016) (0.013)  (0.003) (0.001)  (0.853) (0.090) 
LnTA -0.284*** -0.823***  0.094*** 0.193***  0.001 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.113) (0.650) 
LnAGE 0.227*** 0.366**  -0.011 -0.043**  0.011*** 0.036*** 
 (0.000) (0.011)  (0.131) (0.034)  (0.000) (0.000) 
BIG4 0.600*** 1.415***  -0.112*** -0.300***  0.012 0.049** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.132) (0.021) 
LnCLIENT -0.116* 0.065  -0.003 -0.010  -0.004** -0.018** 
 (0.063) (0.651)  (0.683) (0.597)  (0.013) (0.031) 
FSPE -0.102 0.190  0.013 -0.025  -0.005 -0.040* 
 (0.508) (0.407)  (0.448) (0.569)  (0.648) (0.093) 
PSPE 1.014*** 1.290***  -0.109*** -0.247***  0.053** -0.007 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.009) (0.000)  (0.034) (0.903) 
FEERATIO 0.269 0.621  -0.034 -0.001  0.003 -0.002 
 (0.246) (0.240)  (0.247) (0.994)  (0.729) (0.940) 
FEMALExPSPE 1.915* 2.099*  -0.259*** -0.320**  -0.010 -0.014 
 (0.070) (0.092)  (0.000) (0.011)  (0.758) (0.862) 
Constant 2.833*** 14.159***  -1.713*** -3.725***  0.000 0.208** 
 (0.002) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.990) (0.014) 
Industry Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Year Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
         
N 2,767 2,767  2,767 2,767  2,767 2,767 
Statistical significance based on a two – tailed test at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels are 
denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
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The audit firm industry specialization interaction term (FEMALE x FSPE) is 
examined and reported in Table 5.8. The results of Panel A show a marginally 
significant interaction effect (FEMALE x FSPE) on PBANK (1.473, p = 0.096) but no 
significant interaction effect is found with ROA and INVREC. Panel B of Table 5.8 
reveals that there is no interaction effect identified on all three individual dependent 
variables. The impact of firm-level industry specialization on the association between 
client risk and the gender of audit partner is generally not significant. 
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Table 5.8: Industry Specialist- Audit Firm Industry Specialist 
 
Panel A: Estimated Coefficients for OLS Regression 
 PBANK  ROA  INVREC 
Variable Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
(p-value) 
 Estimate 
(p-value) 
FEMALE -2.010***  0.222**  -0.013 
 (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.360) 
LnTA -1.737***  0.349***  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.852) 
LnAGE 1.525***  -0.163***  0.025*** 
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.000) 
BIG4 1.967***  -0.371***  0.020 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.115) 
LnCLIENT -0.092  -0.016  -0.008* 
 (0.676)  (0.663)  (0.086) 
FSPE -0.328  0.009  -0.037*** 
 (0.400)  (0.906)  (0.007) 
PSPE 2.814***  -0.452***  0.046 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.195) 
FEERATIO 1.376  -0.142  -0.006 
 (0.115)  (0.187)  (0.741) 
FEMALExFSPE 1.473*  -0.102  0.023 
 (0.096)  (0.471)  (0.388) 
Constant 27.905***  -6.351***  0.063 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.198) 
Industry Included  Included  Included 
Year Included  Included  Included 
      
N 2,767  2,767  2,767 
R-squared 0.116  0.138  0.272 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 6: Empirical Results 81 
 
Table 5.8: Industry Specialist- Audit Firm Industry specialist 
(continued) 
 
Panel B: Estimated Coefficients for Quantile Regression 
 PBANK  ROA  INVREC 
Variable q50 q80  q50 q20  q50 q80 
FEMALE -0.569*** -0.832**  0.063*** 0.173***  -0.001 -0.046* 
 (0.000) (0.011)  (0.005) (0.001)  (0.844) (0.067) 
LnTA -0.281*** -0.814***  0.094*** 0.192***  0.001 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.156) (0.544) 
LnAGE 0.232*** 0.427***  -0.011 -0.048**  0.010*** 0.036*** 
 (0.000) (0.002)  (0.120) (0.024)  (0.000) (0.000) 
BIG4 0.598*** 1.376***  -0.112*** -0.303***  0.012 0.050** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.114) (0.025) 
LnCLIENT -0.120** 0.068  -0.002 -0.009  -0.004** -0.019** 
 (0.017) (0.618)  (0.743) (0.644)  (0.011) (0.021) 
FSPE -0.212 0.088  0.015 -0.013  -0.005 -0.042* 
 (0.151) (0.789)  (0.414) (0.787)  (0.618) (0.077) 
PSPE 1.116*** 1.353***  -0.133*** -0.265***  0.053** -0.006 
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.023) (0.848) 
FEERATIO 0.254 0.532  -0.033 0.013  0.002 -0.004 
 (0.260) (0.335)  (0.218) (0.841)  (0.764) (0.914) 
FEMALExFSPE 0.550 1.016  -0.018 -0.122  -0.003 0.029 
 (0.174) (0.291)  (0.720) (0.253)  (0.869) (0.556) 
Constant 2.793*** 13.934***  -1.719*** -3.697***  0.000 0.211** 
 (0.003) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.987) (0.015) 
Industry Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Year Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
         
N 2,767 2,767  2,767 2,767  2,767 2,767 
Statistical significance based on a two – tailed test at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels are 
denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
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5.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Consistent with expectations, the empirical results presented in this chapter 
show that female and male auditors appear to differ systematically in their client 
portfolios. First, the results of pooled OLS regression indicate that companies with 
female auditors show better performance in terms of profitability and are less likely to 
be financially distressed. However, there is no significant difference between clients of 
female auditors and those with male auditors in terms of overall risky account structure. 
Unlike the summary measure of client financial distress (PBANK), any one individual 
ratio in isolation, such as INVREC, may not be sufficient to indicate the client firm’s 
riskiness, though it helps to identify the particular source of client risk (Choi et al. 2004). 
Nonetheless, the overall results suggest that female auditors on average have less risky 
clients for their client portfolios than male auditors, supporting H1. Consistent with H2, 
the results of the QR show that companies with female auditors have fewer problems 
associated with financial distress, profitability and the complex structure of accounts, 
and these relations are more pronounced among the riskiest group than in the median. 
The results are robust when using balanced panel data and a subsample of yearly data 
from 2013 and 2014.  
Additional analyses reveal that companies with specialised female auditors 
measured at the individual auditor level are more likely to be risky relative to those of 
non-specialist female audit partners and this effect is exacerbated in the high-risk 
engagement context. The association between auditor specialists and client riskiness is 
consistent with a prior study which demonstrated that assigning industry experts is used 
as a risk adaptation strategy for audit firms to mitigate the high-risk clients (Johnstone 
and Bedard 2004).  
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Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusions 
6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
This thesis investigates whether and how auditor gender affects auditors’ client 
acceptance decisions. Building on social identity theory and prior evidence of the 
potential effects of auditor gender on the audit process and audit quality, in addition to 
the negative association between client-related risk factors and auditors’ client 
acceptance decisions, this study posits that female and male auditors may differ 
systematically in gathering client-related information and evaluating any risks 
identified. Specifically, based on gender differences in cognitive information processing 
and risk attitudes, I hypothesize that female auditors on average choose less risky clients 
for their client portfolios than male auditors (H1). Further, I anticipate that such 
negative association between female auditors and clientele riskiness will be exacerbated 
in a high-risk engagement context (H2).  
This study examines the setting of Australian listed companies from 2013 and 
2014 in which the engagement partners were required to disclose their names in audit 
reports. Tests based on client characteristics - a summary measure of financial distress 
(PBANK) along with disaggregated accounting ratios such as profitability (ROA) and 
the risky account structure (INVREC) - indicate that female auditors have, on average, 
less risky clients in their client portfolios compared to male auditors, as predicted, and 
thus supporting H1. Consistent with H2, the negative relation between female auditors 
and the level of engagement risk are exacerbated in high-risk engagement conditions; 
companies with female auditors have fewer problems associated with financial distress, 
profitability and the complex structure of accounts, and these relations are more 
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pronounced among the riskiest group than the median of the sample. These findings 
have been tested for robustness by using balanced panel data and a subsample of yearly 
data from 2013 and 2014 for additional analysis.  
The main results of this study support and extend prior research on auditor gender 
differences in the audit process and generation of audit reports, and potential effects of 
gender stereotypes in the decision-making context.  
First, consistent with prior research on the effect of gender differences on auditor 
judgements and audit reports (e.g., Hardies et al. 2014; Ittonen and Vähämaa 2013; 
Niskanen et al. 2011), this study provides evidence that auditor gender differences do 
influence the evaluation of engagement risk and thus client acceptance decisions. 
Several authors have noted (Hardies 2011; e.g.,Croson and Gneezy 2009) that while 
extensive research reports gender differences in behaviours and judgements, there are 
relatively few theoretical explanations of why certain types of distinct gender-related 
behaviours are consistently reported. 
Building on social identity theory, this study demonstrates the importance of 
context in examining gender differences, supporting prior research on gender 
stereotypes in the auditing context (Hardies 2011; Anderson-Gough et al. 2005; 
Kornberger et al. 2010). Furthermore, this study extends earlier research by adding the 
important situational factor of a high-risk engagement context, which can magnify 
gender differences and lead to observable differences within the professional arena. 
Given the nature of auditors’ work, which is subject to a set of professional codes and 
standards and professional training, it would be naïve to expect auditor gender 
differences to be clear in every decision-making context. Hence, identifying the factors 
that may motivate individual auditors’ specific behaviours is important for 
understanding individual differences within the audit context.  
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This study suggests audit firms should consider gender differences in assigning 
staff, especially audit partners, to audit groups, in addition to providing training and 
developing decision aids. Furthermore, if implicit stereotypes are part of the 
organisational culture and subtle biases may unconsciously influence auditors’ 
judgement, diversity training and direct intervention such as mentoring programs may 
be appropriate.  
 
Additional analysis yields a number of new insights into the role of industry 
specialized auditors and the size of audit firms. First, the present study examined the 
contingent effect of industry-specific auditors measured both at the individual auditor 
and audit firm levels and examined auditor gender in terms of the riskiness of client 
portfolios. The results reveal that clients of specialized female auditors measured at the 
individual auditor level are more likely to be risky relative to those of other auditors and 
that this phenomenon is exacerbated in the high-risk engagement context. However, 
clients of female firm-level auditor industry specialists do not differ from those with 
male firm-level auditor industry specialists.  
The relationship between auditor specialists and clientele riskiness is consistent 
with earlier case studies on client acceptance decisions (Johnstone and Bedard 2004), 
demonstrating that assigning industry specialist personnel may mitigate high-risk 
clients; those clients which might otherwise be unacceptable are accepted by audit firms 
depending on the availability of specialized personnel (Johnstone and Bedard 2004).  
The results in terms of audit-firm level specialists are also consistent with 
previous research on the effect of auditor industry specialists on audit quality (Chi and 
Chin 2011), which shows that firm-level auditor specialists alone are not significantly 
associated with a higher propensity of issuing a going concern opinion (GCO), but that 
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clients at the individual-level of auditor specialists are likely to receive a GCO, thereby 
suggesting more intensive audit quality. While the study highlights the importance of 
recognizing individual auditors’ differences and confirms that individual auditors are 
hardly homogeneous even within the same industry-specialized audit firm, the reasons 
why clients of female specialized auditors are riskier remains unclear, and remains an 
area for further investigation.  
One possible explanation for why clients of female specialized auditors are riskier 
is offered by social identity theory. From this perspective, the very implicit stereotypes 
which may make female auditors concerned about being judged on the basis of their 
gender rather than their professional identity further inhibit female auditors’ confidence 
in client acceptance decision-making. Therefore, it is plausible that female auditors feel 
particularly vulnerable if they make mistakes and hence may only accept risky clients 
when they are highly confident that they have the appropriate skills and competencies to 
serve those clients. In other words, deep knowledge and technology associated with 
certain clients’ particular industries would drive female specialized auditors to act more 
like their male counterparts, leading to no gender differences. Supporting this view, 
while males’ risk-taking propensity is well documented, some findings of behavioural 
finance research suggest that females do take as much risk as males, or even accept 
more risk than males, as long as they believe that they have superior investment skills 
(Meyers-Levy and Loken 2015; Olsen and Cox 2001; Barber and Odean 2001).  
Second, the results of the main tests in the present study are consistent only with 
the subsample of non-BIG 4 audit firms; there were no significant effects of auditor 
gender in the BIG 4 subsample. While this finding is somewhat unexpected, one 
possibility is that the BIG 4 firms differ from other firms in terms of the extent to which 
the decision context is structured. Large public accounting firms are required to 
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establish appropriate policies and procedures for making client acceptance decisions; 
research also suggests that large audit firms actively manage their client portfolios as a 
risk containment strategy (Stimpson 2008; Johnstone et al. 2004; Gendron 2001). 
Accordingly, BIG 4 auditors may be subject to more structured client acceptance 
procedures such as formal criteria, hierarchical review and additional approvals than 
other auditors, thereby leading to more standardized decisions. Technology-enabled 
decision mechanisms for auditors’ client acceptance decisions such as KPMG’s KRisk 
(Bell et al. 2001) and the acceptance and retention committees (ARCs) implemented by 
several BIG 4 audit firms (Stimpson 2008) exemplify these trends. Alternatively, or 
perhaps additionally, BIG 4 audit firms’ public commitment to promoting gender 
diversity in the workplace may lead to parallel changes in policies and training, thereby 
reducing actual gender bias within BIG 4 audit firms.  
6.2 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis is subject to several limitations. First, this study focuses on Australian 
listed companies; therefore, it may be difficult to generalize the results to other 
countries unless the differences in legal and social environment are well addressed. This 
limitation opens the door for replicative studies to test auditor gender effects in the 
context of different countries. 
Second, this study examines a relatively short, post-GFC period from 2013 to 
2014, when there was a greater focus on risk: accordingly, its results could be specific 
to the time period under examination. Studies that include multiple-year data may offer 
a better examination of the findings in the present research, which is another important 
future research opportunity. 
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Third, while audit engagement partners are fully responsible for the process of 
making client acceptance decisions, it should be noted that the audit engagement 
process always involves two parties and that acceptance decisions are jointly made by 
both the auditor and the prospective or existing client. Therefore, while the results could 
show an association between auditor gender and clientele riskiness, explanations that 
focus only on the auditor decision-making process may limit the ability to assign 
causality to the results. Furthermore, although other auditor characteristics and client-
related attributes were controlled in this study, there might be omitted variables and 
endogeneity issues associated with the reported results. This is an area in which future 
research can address a more comprehensive inclusion of possible control variables. 
Finally, this study uses mainly financial characteristics of client firms as a proxy 
measure for the riskiness of female and male auditors’ clienteles. However, auditors 
assess engagement risk based on both financial and non-financial information (e.g. 
management integrity, control environment, etc.), which is unobservable and for which 
gathering the necessary data within the present study setting is difficult. Future research 
into how individual auditors incorporate both financial and non-financial information 
when evaluating client risks or an inclusion of governance characteristics (e.g. audit 
committee, the board, etc.) may provide further insight into which risk factors affect 
auditors’ decisions and how female and male auditors assess client risk factors 
differently.  
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